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The Consumer Imaginary: Labor
Rights, Human Rights, and
Citizen-Consumers in the Global
Supply Chain
Kevin Kolben
ABSTRACT

Consumers are increasingly demanding that the goods and
services they consume be produced in a way that meets their
social expectations. By extension, they are exhibiting greater
willingness to pay more at the cash registerfor products made in
good working conditions, and they are willing to punish
companies that do not satisfy these expectations. Driving these
"citizen-consumers" is what this Article terms the "consumer
imaginary," which is defined as the narratives that consumers
tell themselves about the people that make their things-people
whom consumers will likely never meet, and whose lived
experiences are distant from their own. Policymakers have
attempted to extraterritoriallyimprove working conditions in the
global supply chain through public law in at least two ways: (1)
incorporating labor standards into trade law and free trade
agreements, and (2) corporatetransparencylaws. Using these two
examples as case studies, this Article argues that both of these
tools could be better tailored to beneficially exploit the consumer
imaginary and mobilize citizen-consumers to compel lead firms
to improve labor and human rights in their supply chains.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Imagine, if you will, the person who sewed the zipper onto your
favorite jacket. Have you ever met this person, or anyone who has
worked in a garment factory? If not, how do you imagine him or, most
likely, her? What is her name? Is she married? Is she a mother? What
kind of home does she sleep in at night? What does her workplace look
like? Smell like?
Now think a moment about the cup of coffee that you drank this
morning. Picture the landscape of the plantation on which the coffee
bushes grew. In your mind, form an image of the faces and the hands
of the people who picked the raw coffee beans that eventually made it
into your mug. What do you think were the working conditions of those
people whom you now have a mental image of?
If you "played along" in the exercise above, you have just engaged
in what this Article terms the "consumer imaginary." That is, you
created for yourself a narrative and mental image of the producers and
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origins of two distinct products that are staples for hundreds of
millions of people. Yet it is highly likely that you have neither worked
on a coffee farm nor in a garment factory; and it is also likely that you
have not had significant social contact with anyone who has.
Nevertheless, it is quite possible that your consumption choices are, or
could be, affected by the ways in which you imagine, or are made to
imagine, (1) the context in which the goods you consume were
produced, and (2) the degree to which you feel a bond with the
producers of those goods.
This Article argues that the law should motivate citizen-consumers
to improve labor conditions and human rights compliance in the global
supply chain by triggering the consumer imaginary. Two brief
examples illustrate this idea. In 1996, reports emerged that workers
making Nike sneakers in Indonesia were being paid below subsistence
wages in violation of Indonesian law and working in highly abusive
conditions.' As a result, labor activists pressured Nike to make a
change, and Nike saw drops in its share price and revenue that likely
2
had at least some connection with the negative coverage. The
reputational pressure, along with other fiscal pressures that Nike was
concurrently facing, led Nike CEO Phil Knight to rue the fact that the
Nike swoosh, which many consumers closely identified with, had come
to symbolize slave-like labor conditions and abuse, and he
acknowledged that "the American consumer does not want to buy
3
products made in abusive conditions." Nike has, by many observers'
accounts, significantly improved its supply chain compliance program
4
by introducing several experimental initiatives, and by opening its
5
programs to the study and scrutiny of scholars.
A growing body of research suggests that Phil Knight's intuition
was correct: an important segment of consumers is increasingly acting
as citizen-consumers. 6 That is, they take into account the social and
environmental context of the goods they consume and make

RANDY SHAW, RECLAIMING AMERICA: NIKE, CLEAN AIR, AND THE NEW
1.
NATIONAL ACTIVISM 13-16 (Univ. of Cal. Press 1999).
DAVID VOGEL, THE MARKET FOR VIRTUE: THE POTENTIAL AND LIMITS OF
2.
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 79 (2d ed., Brookings Inst. Press 2006).

Id. at 79-80.
3.
See Angharad Porteous & Sonali Rammohan, Integration, Incentives and
4.
InnovationNike's Strategy to Improve Social and Environmental Conditions in its Global
Supply Chain, STAN. INST. FOR THE STUDY OF SUPPLY CHAIN RESPONSIBILITY (Nov. 19,
2013), https://www.gsb.stanford.edulsites/ gsb/files/publication-pdf/non-teaching-case[https://perma.cc/STM5-XJP9]
study-nike-strategy-improve-global-supply-chain.pdf
(archived Aug. 12, 2019).
See, e.g., RICHARD M. LOCKE, THE PROMISE AND LIMITS OF PRIVATE POWER:
5.
PROMOTING LABOR STANDARDS IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 46-77 (Cambridge Univ. Press

2013) (drawing on data provided by Nike to study supply chain compliance effectiveness);
Greg Distelhorst, Jens Hainmueller & Richard M. Locke, Does Lean Improve Labor
Standards?Management and Social Performance in the Nike Supply Chain, 63 MGMT.
SCI. 587, 707 (2016).

6.

See infra Part III.C.
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purchasing choices based on these considerations. 7 Consumer
citizenship and political consumerism are widely discussed phenomena
in scholarly literature, including in sociology, 8 political science, 9
history,10 and marketing." Legal scholars have also now begun to turn
their attention to the role of consumer citizenship and socially driven
consumption, including in tort law, 12 corporate law,13 intellectual
property law,14 and trade law.15 But the potential of consumers serving
as regulatory agents remains underexamined by legal scholars. This
Article aims to contribute to this nascent stream of legal scholarship
by examining the role of the consumer in supply chain regulation
through the conceptual lens of consumer citizenship, and by proposing
ways that (1) trade and labor provisions and (2) corporate disclosure
laws can exploit the consumer imaginary to beneficial ends. These two

&

7.
Id.
8.
See, e.g., Craig J. Thompson, Understanding Consumption As Politicaland
Moral Practice:Introduction to the Special Issue, 11 J. CONSUMER CULTURE 139, 139
(2011) (introducing a special issue on the intersections between consumption and
citizenship ideals).
9.
See, e.g., Lauren Copeland, Conceptualizing Political Consumerism: How
Citizenship Norms Differentiate Boycotting From Buycotting, 62 POL. STUD. 257, 258
(2013) (noting that political practices are moving toward non-electoral politics such as
political consumerism); VOGEL, supra note 2, at 46-56 (describing the rising role of
consumers in driving corporate social responsibility initiatives); Margaret M. Willis
Juliet B. Schor, Does Changing a Light Bulb Lead to Changing the World? Political
Action and the Conscious Consumer, 644 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SC. 160 (2012);
Michael Schudson, The Troubling Equivalence of Citizen and Consumer, 608 ANNALS
AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Scl. 193 (2006) (arguing that consumer choices are also often
political choices).
10.
See, e.g., Terry Newholm, Sandra Newholm & Deirdre Shaw, A History for
Consumption Ethics, 57 BUS. HIST. 290 (2015) (discussing the history of ethical
consumption and challenging the economic view of consumers as simply economic
maximizers).

11.
In the business literature, the issue is often addressed from the perspective
of consumers reaction to Corporate Social Responsibility efforts and its effect on
competitive advantage. See, e.g., C.B. Bhattacharya, Shuili Du, & Sankar Sen, Corporate
Social Responsibility and Competitive Advantage: Overcoming the Trust Barrier, 57
MGMT. SCI. 1528, 1528 (2011) (discussing the role of CSR initiatives in strengthening
competitive advantage).
12.
See, e.g., Sarah Dadush, Identity Harm, 89 U. COLO. L. REV. 863, 868 (2018)
(arguing that there should be a remedy in tort for harms to a consumer's emotional and
psychic harm when a brand betrays their social or environmental commitments).
13.
See, e.g., Galit A. Sarfaty, Shining Light on Global Supply Chains, 56 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 419, 420 (2015) (arguing that current corporate transparency mandates are
limited in their ability to improve human rights and labor practices).
14.
See Margaret Chon, Slow Logo: Brand Citizenship in Global Value Networks,
47 U.C. DAvis L. REV. 935, 964-65 (2014) (arguing for greater information flows between
producers, consumers, and other stakeholders as a means of improving a brand's social
and environmental performance in the value chain).
15.
See, e.g., Douglas A. Kysar, Preferences for Processes: The Process/Product
Distinction and the Regulation of Consumer Choice, 118 HARv. L. REV. 525, 624 (2004)
(arguing that political consumerism requires greater allowance for information about
processes in the supply chain); Kevin Kolben, A New Model For Trade And Labor? The
Trans-PacificPartnership'sLabor Chapter and Beyond, 49 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL.
1063, 1064-71 (2017) (arguing that trade and labor provisions in trade agreements ought
to be partially grounded in a consumer citizenship framework).
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areas of law were chosen because they are the two domains that most
directly seek to impact labor and human rights abuses in the global
supply chain. In the case of disclosure laws, the consumer is already
implicitly part of the laws' design, albeit, it is argued, in an ineffective
way. In trade law, it is argued that the consumer could be explicitly
utilized as a tool to effectuate the goals of improving labor conditions
in trading partner countries.
To make this case, Part II describes the economic and political
drivers that have given rise to consumer citizenship. A significant
16
driver has been the evolution of "the supply chain economy." In recent
decades, the organization of the global economy has led to increasingly
disaggregated production processes that have taken the form of
complex supply chains whereby production has been contracted out to
17
far flung suppliers around the globe. One of the implications of this
has been a transformation of the employer-employee relationship,
whereby lead firms do not have direct control or liability for the
18
working conditions in their supply chain.
The conflict that arises in this arrangement, as examined in Part
III, is that the working conditions in suppliers' factories are often poor
19
and do not meet the expectations of global consumers. This is because
the labor law regimes of the countries in which suppliers' factories are
located often lack adequate enforcement capacity andlor will to
improve labor standards.20 Informed and mobilized by transnational
labor activist networks (TLANS) and an increasingly attuned media,
consumers have been increasingly taking into account the social
21
conditions under which the goods that they buy are made.
Indeed, as Part IV argues, consumers' identities are increasingly
linked to the products that they choose to buy. This tight linkage has
compelled a number of them to try and use their purchasing decisions
22
as a means of social and political action. This Article refers to this
phenomenon as "cosmopolitan consumer citizenship." This term
describes the actions of citizen-consumers who believe that they have
a duty to the producers with whom their consumptive and economic
lives are bound. They wield their consumptive activity in the market
as a means of engaging in political and social action across borders.
Confronted with the weak extraterritorial regulation of supply chains,
cosmopolitan consumer citizenship is a reaction to the inability of
consumers to address labor and human rights abuses in the global

16.

See infra Part II.

INFORMATION
THE GREAT CONVERGENCE:
See RICHARD BALDWIN,
17.
TECHNOLOGY AND THE NEW GLOBALIZATION 5-10 (Belknap Press 2016).
See DAVID WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE: WHY WORK BECAME So BAD FOR
18.

So MANY AND WHAT CAN BE DONE TO IMPROVE IT 179 (Harv. Univ. Press 2014).
See infra Part III.
19.
Id.
20.
See infra Part IV.
21.
Id.
22.
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supply chain through traditional forms of domestic political
engagement.
An important driver of this new form of citizenship, Part V argues,
is an increase in the physical and "social distance" between producers
and consumers that is a result of the disaggregated supply chain
economy. This expanding distance bothers many consumers, and they
are increasingly seeking to recapture one of the most basic forms of
localized social interaction-purchasing, trading, and consuming goods
and services from people they personally know.2 3 But there is a tension
here: in a globalized economy, there are few direct personal
relationships between consumers and producers, and the bonds
between them are largely imagined. 24 The imagined nature of those
relationships, which is termed here as the "consumer imaginary" and
which provides the title of this Article, both poses risks and holds out
promise for regulatory efforts to improve labor and human rights in
the global supply chain.25
While the primary approach of this Article is conceptual, Part VI
turns to the concrete and suggests how the theoretical discussion can
be applied to law and legislation. There are two central ways that
public law has heretofore attempted to regulate labor conditions in the
global supply chain. The first is through trade law and trade
agreements. 26 US trade law has long included labor criteria in its trade
legislation and its free trade agreements (FTAs). 27 Increasingly, the
FTAs of a number of countries have included labor provisions requiring
that trading partners comply with various labor standards and engage
in certain processes at the risk, in some instances, of being subject to
trade dispute procedures and remedies. 28

23.

See Joyce E. Williams, Social Distance, in BLACKWELL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF

SOCIOLOGY (George Ritzer ed., 2007) (tracing the development of the term social
distance).
24.
They are imagined in a similar way that the scholar Benedict Anderson
observed the bonds between citizens of the nation-state to be. BENEDICT ANDERSON,
IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE ORIGIN AND SPREAD OF NATIONALISM 1,
62 (2d rev. ed. 2006).

25.

See Kevin Kolben, Transnational Private Labor Regulation, Consumer-

Citizenship, and the Consumer Imaginary, in HANDBOOK ON TRANSNATIONAL LABOR

REGULATION 361, 370-71 (Adelle Blacket & Anne Trebilcock eds., 2015); see also infra
Part V.
26.
See infra Part VI.A.
27.
See, e.g., Jeffrey S. Vogt, The Evolution of Labor Rights and Trade-A
Transatlantic Comparison and Lessons for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership, 18 J. INT'L ECON. L. 827, 835 (2015) (describing the evolution of labor
provisions in US FTAs); Lance A. Compa & Jeffrey S. Vogt, Labor Rights in the
Generalized System of Preferences:A 20-Year Review, 22 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 199,
205 (2001) (analyzing the history and success of labor rights conditionality in the
generalized system of preferences regime in the United States).
28.
Between 2013 and 2016, 80 percent of all FTAs entered into globally had labor
provisions.
See
INTERNATIONAL
LABOUR
ORGANIZATION,
THE HANDBOOK ON
ASSESSMENT OF LABOUR PROVISIONS IN TRADE AND INVESTMENT ARRANGEMENTS 1
(Geneva, 2017) [hereinafter ILO HANDBOOK ON LABOUR PROVISIONS].
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The second way is through disclosure and transparency laws aimed
directly at lead firms. 29 While the regulation of global supply chains
has been largely left to the market, in recent years legislation in
Europe and, now increasingly, the United States has been enacted or
proposed that compels firms to generate and reveal information about
their supply chain practices.3 0 These laws have not prescribed the
actual conduct of lead firms vis-a-vis their supply chains, but rather
require that they disclose the processes by which they have conducted
due diligence to ensure that their supply chains are free of certain
31
kinds of human and labor rights violations. In this sense, the laws
rely on consumers taking this information into account, or,
32
alternatively, on companies fearing that consumers will do so. This is
supposed to motivate companies to root out labor and human rights
violations from their supply chains.3 3 Both mechanisms have been
subject to critique for inadequately achieving their aims of improving
34
working conditions in the supply chain. This Article argues that
trade and disclosure laws would be more effective if they could better
reduce social distance and trigger the consumer imaginary, which in
turn would better mobilize and catalyze consumer citizenship.

II. THE SUPPLY CHAIN ECONOMY

In order to understand cosmopolitan consumer citizenship and its
role in generating supply chain governance and regulation regimes,
this Article will briefly review the economic context that has fueled its
rise. This Article refers to this economic phenomenon as the "supply
chain economy." The supply chain economy is facilitated and
economic
characterized by three interrelated dynamics: (1)
work.
unbundling, (2) firm transaction costs, and (3) fissured
A. Economic Unbundling
The last century has experienced dramatic growth in world trade
and economic integration, which has rapidly accelerated in the last
three decades.3 5 Since 1990 alone, total world exports of goods and
See infra Part VI.B.
29.
Susan A. Aaronson & Ethan Wham, Can Transparency in Supply Chain
30.
Advance Labor Rights? Mapping of Existing Efforts 1, 5 (Geo. Wash. Univ., Inst. for Int'l
Econ. Policy Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. IIEP-WP-2016-6, 2016) (noting
that by 2011 there were 23 countries in Europe requiring companies to divulge social
and environmental information).
Id. at 9, 16.
31.
See id. at 13.
32.
See id. at 16.
33.
See infra Part VI.
34.
BANK,
WORLD
Services,
and
Goods
of
Export
35.
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.EXP.GNFS.CD (last visited Sept. 14, 2019)
[https://perma.cc/RYG6-FM5G] (archived Aug. 12, 2019).
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services has grown from about $2.3 trillion in 1980, to a high of about
$24 trillion 2014, and in 2017 stood at $23.064 trillion. 36 As Richard
Baldwin and others document, the first stage of globalization began in
earnest in 1820 with the advent of the steamship and railroads, which
dramatically lowered the costs of moving goods over long distances. 3
This stage marked the beginning of the separation of consumption from
production, or what Baldwin describes as the unbundling of the tight
geographic relationship between production and consumption.3 8 That
is, while production used to take place very close to the point of
consumption in more artisanal forms of manufacturing, now
production has become increasingly geographically concentrated in
specialized manufacturing areas that could be some distance from the
end consumers.3 9 This early stage of globalization was what Baldwin
calls the "first unbundling." 40 But while transportation costs were
decreasing, the world trading system had been raising tariffs,
particularly during the interwar periods. 4 1 Increased tariffs slowed the
process of separation of consumption from production, but hastened
the onset of World War 11.42 After World War II, nations started to
reduce tariffs in earnest through the Bretton Woods institutions and
agreements, such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT). 43 Tariff reductions combined with the advent of
containerization and other improvements in transportation technology
led to a dramatic reduction in overall trading costs, and only
accelerated the process of separating consumption and production. 44
The lowering of global tariffs was further accelerated by the creation
of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995, and while individual
tariff rates have fluctuated, since 1996 weighted average tariffs have
decreased from about 34 percent in 1996 to 2.59 percent in 2017.45
Developing countries have particularly benefited from this. Eighty
percent of all developing country exports to developed countries are
now duty free, thanks to decreased bound tariff levels negotiated in the

36.

Id.

37.
RICHARD BALDWIN, THE GREAT CONVERGENCE: INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
AND THE NEW GLOBALIZATION 49-53 (Belknap Press 2016).

Id. at 4.
38.
39.
Id. at 8.
40.
Id. at 5.
41. Id. at 64-67.
42. Id. at 66.
43. Id. at 67-75.
44. Id. at 67-78.
45. Data, WORLD BANK, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/TM.TAX.MRCH.
WM.AR.ZS?end=2017&start=1996&view=chart
(last visited
Sept.
14,
2019)
[https://perma.cc/8WAC-6VT9] (archived Aug. 12, 2019).
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WTO, preferential trade arrangements, and regional and bilateral free
trade agreements. 46
The second significant unbundling began roughly in the 1980s with
the rapid development of new information and communication
technologies (ICT). 4 7 The ICT revolution was a combination of rapidly
in
advances
with
combined
power
computer
increasing
telecommunications. 48 The ICT revolution, combined with the first
unbundling's lower transportation costs and reduced tariffs,
supercharged the processes of globalization and radically altered the
structure of global production. 49 The second unbundling made it
possible, according to Baldwin, to efficiently separate many stages of
production, leading to what has been termed a "global value chain
specific
within
production
words,
other
In
revolution."50
manufacturing sectors became increasingly disaggregated, leading to
51
a rapid expansion of global supply chains.
The global value chain revolution has been an economic boon for
many developing countries. As trade theory would predict, liberalizing
trade regimes and reduced trading costs have led to countries
specializing in economic activities in which they have a comparative
advantage.5 2 A comparative advantage held by many developed
economies has often been research and design, while the comparative
advantage of developing economies has focused on lower labor costs. 5
From the perspective of developing countries, the supply chain
revolution has meant that accessing and participating in those global
54
supply chains has become much more feasible. Importantly, from a
development perspective, gaining access to global supply chains has
been an important means for countries to industrialize through, in
55
part, the access to technical knowledge from lead firms. This has led
to a dramatic shift in manufacturing from developed countries to
in the so-called
developing ones, particularly concentrated
56
Industrializing Six.

(2015),
WTO Tariff Profiles 2015, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
46.
https://www.wto.org/english/res elbooksp_e/tariffprofilesl5_e.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5RLG-88ZC] (archived Aug. 13, 2019). Notably, while tariffs have
dramatically decreased, and do not have a great deal farther to fall, non-tariff barriers.
have arguably been on the rise, even those with non-protectionist intent. See U.N.
Conference on Trade & Dev., Key Statistics and Trends in InternationalTrade, 12, U.N.
(2015), http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/
Doc UNCTAD/DITC/TAB/2015/1
ditctab2015d1len.pdf [https://perma.cc/YU5Q-THPR] (archived Aug. 12, 2019).
BALDWIN, supra note 37, at 79-112.
47.
See id. at 81-85.
48.
Id.
49.
Id. at 217.
50.
Id. at 217-18.
51.
See PAUL KRUGMAN & ROBIN WELLS, ECONOMIcS 217 (5th ed. 2017).
52.
See DOUGLAS A. IRWIN, TRADE UNDER FIRE 34-44 (4th ed. 2015).
53.
54. BALDWIN, supra note 37, at 151.
Id. at 214-16.
55.
These are China, Korea, India, Indonesia, Thailand, and Poland. Id. at 86.
56.
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The contemporary significance of global supply chains to world
trade cannot be overstated. According to the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 80 percent of global
trade is linked to the international supply chains of multinational
enterprises (MNEs).5 7 But it is important to not view global supply
chains as primarily providing manufactured goods to their end users.
In fact, an estimated 60 percent of global trade is constituted by
intermediate goods-that is, goods that are subsequently used in the
manufacture of other goods that are consumed by the end user.5 8 This
is key to understanding the potential and limitations of consumergrounded regulatory regimes because most consumer items are
actually complex bundles of components, the production chains and
processes of which are mostly invisible.5 9 Indeed, it is generally only
the final stage of assembly that attracts the attention of political and
ethical consumers. 6 0
Another important aspect of disaggregated production is that,
while the modern ethical consumer imagination is often focused on
production in developing countries, in fact about half of the value of
trade in goods and two-thirds of trade in services originate from
developed countries. 61 BRICs and developing countries roughly split
the bulk of the rest, while the least developed countries have negligible
participation in world trade. 62 The largest trade flows exist between
developed regions and East Asia, while regions such as Latin America
have much smaller participation rates in global supply chains. 63
Importantly, developing countries have demonstrated the most rapid
increase in integration into trade streams, which means integration
into global supply chains.

64

B. Firms
The discussion above helps show the context of globalization and
the growth of supply chains from the perspective of macroeconomics
and technological change. From the microeconomic perspective of
business decision-making, the supply chain economy has profoundly
affected the make-buy calculus that is described in the transaction cost

57.
U.N. CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., WORLD INVESTMENT REPORT 2013:
GLOBAL VALUE SUPPLY CHAINS: INVESTMENT AND TRADE FOR DEVELOPMENT, at 135,

U.N. Sales No. E.13.I.D.5 (2013).
58.
Id. at 122.
59.

Id.

60.
Id.
61. Key Statistics and Trends in InternationalTrade, supra note 46, at 12.
62. Id. The term 'BRICs' refers to Brazil, Russia, India, and China, which are the
most economically advanced emerging economies.
63.
Id. at 13.
64.
Id. at 14.
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economics literature. 6 5 As Ronald Coase first theorized, and Oliver
Williamson and others later developed, comparative transaction costs
determine whether firms make a product in-house, or use the market
to outsource that manufacturing activity.66 As the transaction costs of
outsourcing business processes and production decrease, it becomes
potentially more profitable for firms to rely on global supply chains,
particularly in a global economic context of decreased trading and
transmission costs. 67
Indeed, global supply chains have become an important source of
68
Logistics and
competitive advantage for the modern corporation.
procurement, once considered to be secondary functions, have become
69
core business activities upon which businesses succeed or fail.
the
Prominent retailers such as Walmart have come to dominate
market in no small part due to their incredible supply chain efficiency
and buying power, becoming price makers that can make or break some
of their suppliers. 70 Brands such as Nike and Apple manufacture
nothing themselves-they are primarily design, retail, and marketing
companies that rely on a far-flung and complex network of suppliers to
71
manufacture and deliver their products. In fact, this phenomenon of
outsourcing production while insourcing design and services is so
common that government agencies have officially termed such
72
companies as "factoryless goods producers," and scholars have begun

See, e.g., Jill E. Hobbs, A Transaction Cost Approach to Supply Chain
65.
Management, 1 SUPPLY CHAIN MGMT. 15, 18-20 (1996) (discussing how transaction cost
analysis can explain levels of vertical integration of the firm).
Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 394-95 (1937);
66.
Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction Cost Economics, HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATION 135-82 (1989) (providing an overview of transaction cost economics);
Oliver E. Williamson, The Economics of Organization:The Transaction Cost Approach,
87 AM. J. SOC. 548, 548 (1981); see also Kish Vinayagamoorthy, Outsourcing Corporate
Accountability, 89 WASH. L. REV. 747, 756-59 (2014) (discussing transaction cost
economics as applied to global value chains and outsourcing).
See Vinayagamoorthy, supra note 66, at 756-69.
67.
See Suhong Li et al., The Impact of Supply Chain Management Practiceson
68.
CompetitiveAdvantage and OrganizationalPerformance, 34 OMEGA 107, 107 (2006).
See WEIL, supra note 18, at 160.
69.
See Paul N. Bloom & Vanessa G. Perry, Retailer Power and Supplier Welfare:
70.
The Case of Wal-Mart, 77 J. RETAILING 379 (2001); Paul Ziobro & Serena Ng, Wal-Mart
Ratchets Up Pressure on Suppliers to Cut Prices, WALL ST. J., Mar. 31, 2015,
https://www.wsj.com/articles/wal-mart-ratchets-up-pressure-on-suppliers-to-cut-prices1427845404 [https://perma.cc/SA26-6WD6] (archived Sept. 15, 2019).
See ANDREw B. BERNARD & TERESA C. FORT, Factoryless Goods Producers in
71.
the US, in THE FACTORY-FREE ECONOMY: OUTSOURCING, SERVITIZATION,

AND THE

FUTURE OF INDUSTRY 1 (Oxford Univ. Press 2017); Robert E. Scott, What Is
Manufacturing and Where Does It Happen?, ECON. POL'Y INST. (July 21, 2014),
https://www.epi.org/publication/what-is-manufacturing-and-where-does-it-happen/
[https://perma.cclSEJ8-FT8R] (archived Oct. 7, 2019).
See Bureau of Labor Statistics, Keeping NAICS Relevant: Identifying and
72.
Classifying Factoryless Goods Producers (FGPs), U.S. DEP'T LAB. (Jan. 9, 2017),
https://www.bls.gov/bls/factoryless-goods-producers.htm [https://perma.cc/P5X6-EGDT]
(archived Oct. 7, 2019).
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to describe the "factory-free economy."7 3 Boeing, for example,
outsourced about 70 percent of the manufacturing and design for its
latest 787 Dreamliner. 74 This constituted a significant increase from
its previous planes, effectively turning the manufacture and design of
its blockbuster new airplane into a highly complex, and in the end
unsuccessful,

supply

chain

management

project.7 5

The

list

of

companies that live and die by their supply chains could continue ad
infinitum. 76 But what is key is that many corporations increasingly
operate as lead firms that contract out significant proportions of
manufacturing and other specific business tasks to contractors around
the globe. 77 These suppliers are "upstream" in the supply chain, and
send the goods and services "downstream" to the lead firms and,
finally, the end consumers.7 8
The degree to which this restructuring of large enterprises has
taken place is so significant that one prominent management scholar
has given it a name: "Nikefication." 79 Gerald Davis agrees with the
notion that corporations have largely become simply a "nexus of
contracts,"8 0 and that this is a harbinger of the end of the public
corporation as it is currently known. 8 ' Corporations, rather than being
built up from scratch centered around a core of productive activities,
are now similar to Lego sets that pick and choose various business

73.
See generally LIONEL FONTAGNI & ANN HARRISON, INTRODUCTION TO THE
FACTORY-FREE EcONOMY: OUTSOURCING, SERVITIZATION, AND THE FUTURE OF INDUSTRY

1 (Oxford Univ. Press 2017) (describing the transformation of industrial economy firms
to becoming focused on design and innovation).
74.
Steve Denning, What Went Wrong at Boeing, FORBES (Jan. 21, 2013, 2:28 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/stevedenning/2013/01/21/what-went-wrong-at-boeing
[https://perma.cc/X7T4-3PCX] (archived on Aug. 12, 2019).
75.
Id.
76.
One of the most studied of these regimes is Toyota's lean management
system, which is essentially a method of managing suppliers, and has been of some
interest to regulatory scholars, as well. See, e.g., William H. Simon, Toyota
Jurisprudence:Legal Theory and Rolling Rule Regimes, LAW & NEw GOVERNANCE IN
THE EU & THE US (Grdinne de Birca & Joanne Scott eds., Hart Publishing 2006).
77.
See WEL, supra note 18, at 270 (citing surveys that find significant
prevalence of subcontracting).
78.
In supply chain management parlance, upstream refers to the manufacturer
of a good who sends the good downstream along the supply chain to the buyers or
distributers of the output. See KENNETH BOYER & ROHIT VERMA, OPERATIONS & SUPPLY
CHAIN MANAGEMENT FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 19 (2010).

79.
Gerald F. Davis, After the Corporation, 41 POL. & SOc. 283, 294 (2013)
[hereinafter Davis I].
80.
See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, The Theory of the Firm:
ManagerialBehavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 311
(1976). But see Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Policing Employment Contacts within the
Nexus-of-Contracts, 43 U. TORONTO L.J. 353, 356 (1993) (critiquing the normative
underpinning of the nexus of contracts perspective from an employment law
perspective); William W. Bratton, Nexus of Contracts Corporation:A CriticalAppraisal,
74 CORNELL L. REV. 407, 411 (1989).
81.
See Gerald F. Davis, The Twilight of the Berle and Means Corporation, 34
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1121, 1127-28 (2010) [hereinafter Davis II].
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82
processes and piece them together according to need. Fewer direct
83
employees are hired, and fewer directly owned assets are required.
This new form of corporate organization-Nikefication-is a form of
intense disintegration and decentralization that has become pervasive
across a number of industries. 84 A significant reason why companies
such as Apple, Nike, Boeing, and others have been able to adopt this
particular mode of operation is closely related to the rapid integration
of the global economy through liberalized trade and investment
regimes, and the ICT revolution.8 5 Reliance on global supply chains
has thus become essential to the modern firm.

C. The FissuredWorkplace
While there are a number of important ramifications of the supply
chain economy, one of the key impacts has been the implications for
labor markets, labor rights, and labor regulation. Previously, when
manufacturing was more vertically integrated, corporations directly
86
Now, firms
employed many workers across a range of functions.
directly employ fewer employees than they otherwise might have had
87
This has
when all production and services remained in-house.
resulted in what David Weil has famously described as the "fissured
workplace," 8 8 whereby "employment is no longer the clear relationship
between a well-defined employer and a worker."8 9 Instead,
"[e]mployment has been actively shed by these . . . [firms] and
90
transferred to a complicated network of smaller business units."

Apple is one example that demonstrates how significant the supply
chain model of employment has become. Apple directly employs about
110 thousand employees. 9 1 These employees primarily work in
research, design, marketing, retail sales, and supply chain
management. 92 Yet the actual number of workers that produce Apple
products and that are engaged in the vast Apple supply chain is far
greater.9 3 According to Apple's Supplier Responsibility Report, over 1.6

See Davis I, supra note 79, at 287.
82.
See id.
83.
84. See id. at 286-88.
See supra Part II.A-B; Davis I, supra note 79, at 285.
85.
Davis I, supra note 79, at 294-95.
86.
Id.
87.
WEIL, supra note 18, at 7-20.
88.
89. Id. at 7.
Id. at 8.
90.
See Apple Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 7 (Oct. 28, 2015).
91.
The prominence of supply chain management as a field has been highlighted
92.
by the ascent of Tim Cook to the CEO position. Cook rose up in Apple's supply chain and
operations wing. See Matt Richtel & Brian X. Chen, Tim Cook Making Apple His Own,
N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2014, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/15/technology/tim-cookmaking-apple-his-own.html [https://perma.cclZHN2-8XBJ] (archived Aug. 12, 2019).
Id.
93.
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million people are employed by Apple's global suppliers, 94 and many of
Apple's suppliers are highly exposed to, and reliant upon, Apple's
business, dedicating much of their employees' time to Apple
production.9 5 Foxconn, for example, which is the largest electronics
manufacturer in the world, is said to derive between 40 to 50 percent
of its revenue from its business contracts with Apple.9 6 What all of this
is to say, is that the control, risk, liability, and legal responsibility for
human resource management have been outsourced, along with
production, to a highly significant degree.
There are clearly advantages, from the lead firm's perspective, to
outsourcing labor management and employment. One advantage is the
reduction of employee-related costs, particularly if one can outsource
noncore competency activities to lower-cost firms and to lower-cost
countries.97 Another advantage is the insulation from legal
responsibility or liability for the employees in the supply chain. This is
because human resource management, wages, and labor law
compliance become the legal and economic responsibility of the
supplier, rather than the lead firm.9 8
But while the globalization of the supply chain might seem to be in
this way advantageous for the lead firm, there are also significant risks
involved with this strategy. One of those risks is that consumers and
civil society have in recent decades increasingly focused their attention
on corporations that utilize upstream contractors that are found to
have abusive labor conditions in their supply chains. This focus has
pressured corporations to take financial and regulatory (if not legal)
responsibility for the labor and environmental conditions in which
their products are manufactured. Lead firms have been forced to
respond, taking steps to regulate their far-flung supply chains, and
even stepping into the shoes of the state, or usurping its role depending
on how one views it. This subject is addressed next.

III. THE CONSUMER STRIKES BACK

This Article has reviewed thus far how economic change and
decreasing transaction costs have led to changes in the structure of
production and of the firm itself. As a result, firms have increasingly
relied on a model of production that relies heavily on global supply
chains. One of the implications of this transformation has been a
fundamental restructuring of work, which has taken the form of
94.
Apple Inc., Supplier Responsibility Progress Report, at 2 (2016).
95.
Id.
96.
Michael Kan, Foxconn builds products for many vendors, but its mud sticks to
Apple, MACWORLD (Oct 24, 2012, 10:45 AM), https://www.macworld.com/article/
2012 9 7 2 /smartphones/foxconn-builds-products-for-many-vendors-but-its-mud-sticks-toapple.html [https://perma.cc/5WET-PR5W] (archived Aug. 12, 2019).
97.
See WEIL, supra note 18, at 49-52.
98.
Id. at 17.
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99
This Part looks at another consequence of the
fissured workplaces.
new supply chain economy, specifically how it has led to increased
demands by consumers and other stakeholders that labor conditions in
those supply chains meet their expectations.

A. The Demand for Social Governance
The restructuring of the economy and work in the supply chain
economy have been beneficial for many firms, but they have also led to
what Karl Polanyi might describe as a double movement, referring to
the social counterreactions that arise in market economies in response
1 00
The more
to the spread of markets and the marketization of society.
that markets become the dominant organizing force of society, Polanyi
argued, the more policies and institutions emerged to check the
10
market's pernicious effects. ' As the world's economies have become
increasingly interconnected, and work and production have become
more geographically dispersed, a different kind of double movement,
which seeks to re-embed markets in society through private means and
institutions, can be observed. A growing number of politically and
ethically motivated consumers, mobilized in part by labor activists and
organizations, have demanded that multinational corporations assure
them that those corporations' products are made in ways that conform
to consumers' ethical and political expectations. 102
In brief, the new organization of the global economy has led to
demands for new forms of labor governance from citizens and their
proxies in their capacity and identities as global consumers. A few
illustrations will help clarify what is meant by this. One of the first
well-publicized instances of consumer citizenship in global supply
chains occurred in 1996, when television celebrity Kathie Lee Gifford
was accused by a labor rights groups of licensing her name to a line of
clothing marketed by Walmart and manufactured by a complicated
network of suppliers, some of which were located in Honduras and
03
In another
employed thirteen- and fourteen-year-old children.

99.

Id. at 11-12.

100.

KARL PoLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION: THE POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC

ORIGINS OF OUR TIME 79 (Beacon Press 1946).
101. Id. Polanyi specifically noted that "human society had become an accessory to
the economic system."Id.
102. See generally MICHELE MICHELEI'TI & DIETLIND STOLLE, POLITICAL
CONSUMERISM: GLOBAL RESPONSIBILITY IN ACTION (2013) (analyzing the rise and causes

of political consumerism);

Jonah Peretti,

The Nike Sweatshop Email: Political

Consumerism, Internet, and Culture Jamming, in POLITICS, PRODUCTS, AND MARKETS:

/

EXPLORING POLITICAL CONSUMERISM 311 (Michele Micheletti & Dietlind Stolle eds.,
2011) (describing contemporary techniques used by consumers and transnational labor
activists against the garment industry).
Those
103. Stephanie Strom, A Sweetheart Becomes Suspect; Looking Behind
27
9 96
/06/
Kathie Lee Labels, N.Y. TIMES, Jun 27, 1996, http://www.nytimes.com/1
business/a-sweetheart-becomes-suspect-looking-behind-those-kathie-lee-labels.html
[https://perma.cc/SZ3N-U6WT] (archived Aug. 12, 2019).
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example, in 2006 the same labor rights group accused Disney, among
others, of using suppliers in Jordan to manufacture apparel that
engaged in highly abusive labor practices, such as confiscating
passports of the mostly foreign workers, forcing the workers to work
unconscionably long hours, and subjecting them to sexual abuse.1 04
Then in the most egregious example of abusive labor conditions in
modern history, on April 24, 2013, over 1,100 Bangladeshi garment
workers were killed and scores more injured when the building in
which they were working, Rana Plaza, collapsed outside of Dhaka,
Bangladesh.1 0 5 Their direct employers were Bangladeshi-owned
factories that were contracted by multinational retailing companies
ranging from the well-known-such as Benetton, Children's Place, and
Primark-to the more anonymous. 106 These retailers, in turn, sold to
individual consumers who resided several thousand miles away,
mostly in Europe and the United States. They, along with other
shoppers, purchased the vast bulk of the over $20 billion in yearly
garment exports that constitute 83.5 percent of Bangladesh's total
exports.107

The news media covered these stories intensively, and the Rana
Plaza collapse in particular.1 0 8 Viewers and readers were confronted
with countless images of rubble and dead workers, arguably blurring
the line between newsworthiness and exploitation. 0 9 The media
clearly believed that news consumers, who are by and large also
clothing consumers, would be deeply moved by this tragedy and be
interested in following the news.11 0 And after a series of online
petitions intended to compel companies doing business in Bangladesh
104. See Charles Kernaghan, U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement Descends into
Human Trafficking & Involuntary Servitude, NAT'L LAB. COMMITTEE (2006).
105. Amy Kazmin, How Benetton Faced Up to the Aftermath of Rana Plaza, FIN.
TIMES,
Apr.
20,
2015,
https://www.ft.com/content/f9d84fOe-e509-1 1e4-8b6100144feab7de [https://perma.cc/CYT8-AHBR] (archived Aug. 12, 2019).
106. Id.
107. See Bangladesh Development Update: Towards Regulatory Predictability,
WORLD
BANK
2-3
(Apr. 2019),
http://documents.worldbank.org/curatedlen/
26 9 2 4 5 5
1 4408636618/pdflBangladesh-Development-Update-Towards-RegulatoryPredictability.pdf [https://perma.cc/C4XW-XK6D] (archived Aug. 12, 2019).
108. See Dana Thomas, Why Won't We Learn from the Survivors of the Rana Plaza
Disaster?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/24/style/
survivors-of-rana-plaza-disaster.html [https://perma.cc/5W3X-36YT (archived Aug. 12,
2019) (describing embarrassing media coverage that compelled brands to take action).
109. For a discussion from a photographer at Rana Plaza and the tensions of
photographing disaster sites, see Ismail Ferdous, Photography as Activism: The Role of
Visual Media in Humanitarian Crises, 36 HARv. INT'L REV. 22 (2014). For a photo
montage, see Jason Motlagh, The Ghosts of Rana Plaza: In Bangladesh, one year after
the worst accident in the history of the garment industry, recovery remains a fragile
process, justice seems elusive, and reform has a long way to go, 90 VA. Q. REV. 44 (2014).
110. A search on Dow Jones Factiva on July 22, 2019 using the search term "Rana
Plaza" returned 23,181 articles from newspapers and magazines around the world.
Agence France Presse printed the most of these articles, and the 9,667 of these were
published in 2013 following the accident. This number does not include television or
other non-print media.
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to take action generated well over a million signatures, many
companies also apparently believed this. Indeed, following the tragedy,
a small group of mostly United States-based companies formed an
initiative to address fire and safety issues in Bangladesh's garment
factories,11x while a larger number of mostly European companies
joined to form a different organization that also had union support. 112
This tragic incident, and the others discussed above, exemplify the
important and growing role of the consumer in the regulation and
governance of labor, the environment, and other issues in global supply
chains.
B. Labor Governance Deficits
The central problem that consumers and labor activists have
sought to redress is the gap that exists between what governments in
exporting countries are willing and/or are able to accomplish, and what
labor activists, workers, and consumers expect to be done. This
phenomenon is related to what Gary Gereffi and Frederick Mayer have
113
notably termed a "governance deficit." A governance deficit refers to
the situation where public governance institutions, international and
domestic, do not have the ability or power to regulate the new economic
forms that have arisen as a result of liberalized trade and investment,
4
including global supply chains.11 In the context of labor, such deficits
can be termed as "labor governance deficits."iis
Labor governance deficits take several forms. One exists at the
16
domestic regulatory jurisdiction in which suppliers are located.1
Often, suppliers are located in countries and jurisdictions whose labor
laws are either dejure or de facto weaker than in the jurisdiction of the
lead firm.ii? If this is the case, then a supplier's factory and production
processes will not be adequately regulated to meet the needs of the
importing firm's own specifications, as well as the importing country's
8
health, safety, or other requirements.11 Thus, if a lead firm relies on
a particular environmental standard or wishes to source a product that
SAFETY,
WORKER
BANGLADESH
FOR
ALL.
generally
111. See
https://www.bangladeshworkersafety.org (last visited Sept. 15, 2019) [https://perma.cc/
LU7E-KWQL] (archived Aug. 12, 2019). The organization ceased operating in 2018 after
five years of activity.
112.

See generally ACCORD ON FIRE & BUILDING

SAFETY IN BANGLADESH,

https://bangladeshaccord.org (last visited Sept. 15, 2019) [https://perma.cclLNG64NWC] (archived Aug. 12, 2019).
113. Gary Gereffi & Frederick Mayer, Regulation and Economic Globalization:
Prospectsand Limits of Private Governance, 12 Bus. & POL. 1, 1-2 (2010).
114. See id. at 1-5.
115. See Kevin Kolben, Transnational Labor Regulation and the Limits of
Governance, 12 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 403,405-07 (discussing various kinds of labor
governance deficits).
116. Id.
117. See David Vogel, The Private Regulation of Global Corporate Conduct:
Achievements and Limitations, 49 Bus. & SOC'Y 68, 71-72 (2009).
118. Id.
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is free of certain hazardous materials, for example, then it cannot rely
on the regulatory rules or enforcement of the exporting country. This
is not to say that these states are simply black holes devoid of any labor
law enforcement. 19 Rather, the supply of regulation is insufficient to
satisfy transnational demand. 120
There are several reasons why this might be the case. One reason
is technical: states often do not have the capacity to enforce their own
labor laws due to a mix of a lack of technical know-how and a lack of
resources. 12 1 But as political scientist Kate MacDonald has noted,
other reasons reflect deliberate political choices made by
governments. 122 A perceived trade-off between high labor standards
and investment means that policymakers might believe that if worker
protections are too strong, then the costs of doing business in the
country will be too high and will drive away investors.12 3 In some
countries, a political factor is that capital is usually substantially more
powerful than workers and unions. Indeed, in many countries,
members of the political class are also often the owners of capital. In
Bangladesh, for example, 60 percent of parliament members are
involved in industry or business and 10 percent directly own garment
factories, by far the largest export industry, with others holding less
direct financial stakes.1 2 4 This serves as a counterweight to increasing
labor standards, which might have redistributive effects on firm
owners.
A second labor governance deficit exists at the international level.
As economic production and activity have become disaggregated and
transnational, there has not arisen a complementary set of
transnational regulatory instruments that can adequately regulate
those processes.1 2 5 While international regulatory networks might
have grown and strengthened,1 26 these networks are engaged in
consultations between state actors rather than engaging in actual
119. See Tim Bartley, Tansnational Governance and The Re-Centered State:
Sustainabilityor Legality?, 8 REG. & GOVERNANCE 93, 95 (2014).
120. Id.
121.

KATE MAcDONALD, THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAINS 1, 37 (2014).

122. Id. at 39.
123. Id. at 38-39; see also Richard M. Locke, Can Global Brands Create Just
Supply Chains?, Bos. REV. (May 21, 2013), http://bostonreview.net/forum/can-globalbrands-create-just-supply-chains-richard-locke [https://perma.cc/NEV9-5NT7] (archived
Aug. 12, 2019).
124. Jim Yardley, Garment Trade Wields Power in Bangladesh, N.Y. TIMES, July
24, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/25/world/asia/garment-trade-wields-powerin-bangladesh.html [https://perma.cclNN6C-3882] (archived Aug. 12, 2019).
125. Kolben, TransnationalLabor Regulation and the Limits of Governance, supra
note 115, at 406; Gary Gereffi & Frederick Mayer, Globalization and the Demand for
Governance, in THE NEW OFFSHORING OF JOBS AND GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT 39, 48-49

(Int'l Labor Office 2008).
126. For a seminal work on transnational regulatory networks that addresses
democracy and accountability issues, see Ann Marie Slaughter, Global Government
Networks, GlobalInformation Agencies, and DisaggregatedDemocracy, 24 MICH. J. INT'L
L. 1041 (2002).
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enforcement activities, and they are thus limited in their ability to
127
The United
address the highly political nature of labor enforcement.
Nations (UN) organization charged with addressing global labor
standards is the International Labor Organization (ILO). Yet many
have argued that it is relatively toothless when it comes to compelling
its member states to enforce their laws, and it has little to no
1 28
enforcement power itself, particularly at the individual factory level.
A final labor governance deficit concerns the ability of home
country jurisdictions of lead firms to legally compel those firms to take
action against their suppliers in instances where suppliers' actions
violate a given set of norms.12 9 Generally speaking, states have little
0
ability or will to regulate the extraterritorial activities of their firms.13
This is particularly the case when the activity in question is one that
is not directly controlled by the lead firm. This has led some scholars
to argue for new legal tools to hold lead firms liable for the conduct of
their suppliers. 3 1 But these proposals as of now are more theoretical
than practical. Another way to create incentives for lead firms to
improve conditions in their supply chains is through transparency and
disclosure laws, and these laws have been increasingly enacted in the
United States and Europe. Transparency laws require lead firms to
divulge certain kinds of information about the supply chain, or to
divulge their good faith efforts in uncovering what occurs in those
supply chains. More discussion of these laws, and some suggestions on

127. See Vinayagamoorthy, supra note 66, at 793-98. Vinayagamoorthy points out
that Networks are voluntary, better at technical issues than policing, and do not include
MNCs in their deliberations.
128. This argument has been widely made. For a critique of the ILO's supervisory
mechanism, see BOB HEPPLE, LABOUR LAwS AND GLOBAL TRADE 25-68 (2005). For a

critique of the statist focus of the ILO, see Yossi Dahan, Hanna Lerner, & Faina MilmanSivan, Shared Responsibility and the International Labour Organization, 34 MICH. J.
INT'L L. 102, 116-36 (2014).
129. See Kolben, TransnationalLabor Regulation and the Limits of Governance,
supra note 115, at 406 (discussing home country labor governance deficits); Katherine
Stone, Labor and the Global Economy: Four Approaches to Transnational Labor
Regulation, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 987, 1011-19 (1996) (discussing extraterritorial
application of U.S. labor law).
130. One notable exception is the U.S Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §
78dd-1 (2018), which forbids US companies from making payments to foreign officials
in order to obtain business contracts.
131. See Alan Hyde, To What Duties to Global Labour Rights Correlate?, in
GLOBAL JUSTICE AND INTERNATIONAL RIGHTS 209,230-32 (Yossi Dahan et al. eds., 2016)
(articulating a very specific set of principles that could be incorporated into hard and soft
law to impose vicarious liability on firms that benefit from non-directly employed labor);
Mark Anner, Jennifer Bair & Jeremy Blasi, Toward Joint Liability in Global Supply
Chains: Addressing the Root Causes of Labor Violations in InternationalSubcontracting
Networks, 35 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 1, 37-38 (2013) (arguing for a new "hot goods"
provision as applied to global supply chains). Mark Anner et al. have also proposed
theories of joint liability, looking to reinstate so called "jobbers agreements" between lead
firms and various stakeholders that would place liability on lead firms for the conduct of
their suppliers; and also have proposed legislative or common law versions of "hot goods"
provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act.
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how to make them more effective, are put forward in Part V of this
Article.
C. Consumer Mobilization: TLANS
Consumers and activists have responded to these governance
deficits in part by seeking nonstate mechanisms to improve supply
chain working conditions. One such mechanism is the mobilization of
consumers and activists to pressure lead firms through transnational
labor activist networks (TLANs).
Building upon Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink's seminal
work on transnational human rights advocacy networks, 132 the
sociologist Gay Seidman has described how TLANs function.13 3 When
poor labor conditions and labor abuses occur in workplaces that
manufacture or provide services for export to a given multinational
consumer or contractor, local activists will provide that information to
transnational activists. 134 Those transnational activists then mobilize
consumers to pressure lead firms to take action and improve working
conditions in their supply chains. 3 5 In a well-functioning democratic
regime, the state would be responsive to the demands of domestic
constituents and would theoretically respond to such pressure. But in
many countries that have jurisdictional authority over suppliers in
global supply chains, the state is often not responsive.1 36 Accordingly,
TLANs reach out to actors, particularly those that have influence on
lead firms to compel those lead firms to ensure that their supply chains
meet the expectations of their stakeholders.13 7 One of the most
potentially powerful stakeholders is consumers, and TLANs make
special efforts to mobilize them, or at least generate a credible threat
of doing so. 1 3 8
TLANs deploy a variety of means to compel lead firms to pressure
the rights-violating supplier to alter its behavior, and even in some
rare situations have managed to compel lead firms to directly
compensate the workers involved if the supplier is unable or unwilling
to do so. 3 9 Using these various tools, TLANs have been remarkably
effective in affecting corporate culture and action. They have also been
132. See generally MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND
BORDERS: ADvoCAcY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (Cornell Univ. Press 1998).
133. See GAY W. SEIDMAN, BEYOND THE BOYCOTT: LABOR RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS,
AND TRANSNATIONAL AcTIVIsM 1, 16-18 (2009).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. See id.
138. See id.
139. For an example of this phenomenon, see Steven Greenhouse, $40 Million in
Aid Set for Bangladesh Garment Workers, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/24/businesslinternational/40-million-in-aid-set-forbangladesh-garment-workers.html [https://perma.cc/34QQ-ABLT] (archived Aug. 12,
2019).
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increasingly effective in impacting public policy and other forms of
domestic and transnational labor governance, or what Sabrina Zajak
1 40
The significance
calls a "global architecture of labor governance."
in the actual
only
not
reflected
is
efforts
and effectiveness of these
school
business
of
content
in
the
tellingly
also
but
practice of companies
14
management
chain
supply
every
about
1
Just
education and research.
textbook in business schools now includes sections on sustainability
and the social impact of the supply chain on the firm's stakeholders,
for they are considered integral aspects of supply chain management42
In other business fields,
not simply a question of business ethics.1
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144
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D. Corporate Supply Chain Compliance
But the most important indicator of the mainstreaming of supply
chain governance initiatives in corporate practice is the widespread
adoption and implementation of supply chain governance programs by
multinationals with far-flung supply chains. Indeed, private
mechanisms of supply chain labor governance are now ubiquitous
among companies with extensive supply chain networks. Many
companies have mainstreamed supply chain labor compliance
programs into their management structures, and they have also in
some instances used supply chain compliance and conditions as part of
45
Because of the success of
their marketing and business strategies.
of companies that source
majority
large
the
time,
over
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in their supply chains in
programs
compliance
instituted
globally have
campaigns directed at
of
intensity
and
number
the
order to reduce
46
activists.1
them by
The rise of supply chain regulatory efforts in recent decades is
notable. Indeed, one might argue that the expectation that companies

140.

See SABRINA ZAJAK, TRANSNATIONAL ACTIVISM, GLOBAL LABOR GOVERNANCE,

AND CHINA 3, 104 (Palgrave Macmillan 2017) (examining the effects of transnational
labor-rights activism on labor rights in China).
141. See id.
142. See, e.g., F. ROBERT JACOBS & RICHARD B. CHASE, OPERATIONS AND SUPPLY
CHAIN MANAGEMENT: THE CORE 26-27 (4th ed. 2016); UNITED NATIONS GLOB. COMPACT
& Bus. FOR Soc. RESPONSIBILITY, SUPPLY CHAIN SUSTAINABILITY: A PRACTICAL GUIDE
FOR CONTINuOUS IMPROVEMENT 1, 13-19 (2010).
143. See MUHAMMED AZIZUL ISLAM, SOCIAL COMPLIANCE ACCOUNTING: MANAGING

LEGITIMACY IN GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAINS 1 (Springer 2015) (noting the centrality of that
social compliance is a major performance issue for MNCs sourcing from developing
countries).
144. See, e.g., DALE NEEF, THE SUPPLY CHAIN IMPERATIVE: HOW TO ENSURE
ETHICAL BEHAVIOR IN YOUR GLOBAL SUPPLIERS (2004).

145. Id. at 5.
146. Id.
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at least proclaim to require, their suppliers' compliance with a basic
minimum of human rights, environmental, and labor rights standards,
has become hegemonic. Increasingly, as a response to TLANs, MNCs
have implemented various supply chain compliance mechanisms, both
individually and through industry-wide efforts.14 7 That is, in response
to pressure from consumers and other relevant stakeholders that exert
power over corporate reputation, including in some cases governments,
lead firms have taken extensive measures in many cases to generate
codes of conduct and to enforce those codes with their suppliers through
contractual provisions, 14 8 albeit with a limited degree of success. 149
Rather than attempting direct communication with consumers
through social labels, these codes of conduct generated by lead firms
constitute an effort to directly regulate supply chains through private
means.
Often, rather than go it alone, firms combine efforts through
industry groups, establishing common codes of conduct for suppliers,
and either coordinate or share compliance and enforcement systems. 15 0
Especially for the most vulnerable companies that function in the
highly targeted area of garments and apparel, they will join and create
multistakeholder initiatives that bring together several different
stakeholder groups, such as universities, NGOs, and governments to
collaborate on compliance in the global supply chain. 151

147.

See S. Prakash Sethi, Self-Regulation through Voluntary Codes of Conduct,

in GLOBALIZATION AND SELF-REGULATION: THE CRUCIAL ROLE THAT CORPORATE CODES
OF CONDUCT PLAY IN GLOBAL BUSINESS 7-10 (2011).

148.

Li-Wen Lin, Legal TransplantsThrough Private Contracting:Codes of Vendor

Conduct in Global Supply Chains As An Example, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 711, 741 (2009)

(arguing that contractual codes of conduct constitutes a form of legal transplantation).
149. The literature discussing this phenomenon and their effectiveness is quite
extensive. See id.; Niklas Egels-Zand6n & Henrik Lindholm, Do Codes of Conduct
Improve Worker Rights in Supply Chains? A Study of Fair Wear Foundation, 107 J.
CLEANER PRODUCTION 31 (2015) (finding marginal improvements in factories subject to
codes of conduct but only for certain workers' rights); Vogel, supra note 117, at 68
(arguing that private codes of conduct are insufficient to constitute a substitute for state
authority. Perhaps the most influential research in recent years on this topic has been
produced by Richard M. Locke and his collaborators, who have argued that what they
describe as compliance approaches to supply chain governance have been largely
ineffective. LOCKE, supranote 5, at 24-45 (describing the limits of a compliance approach
to enforcing codes of conduct and supply chain governance in favor of a cooperation
approach). These scholars argue that cooperative approaches between lead firms and
suppliers will result in better outcomes. Others are skeptical of this view, however,
arguing that a cooperative approach is insufficient to significantly change power
relations between lead firms, suppliers, and workers; nor will it change the structural
problems underlying abusive working conditions in supply chains, such as pressures to
drive down wages and increase productivity. See Peter Lund-Thomsen & Adam
Lindgreen, CorporateSocial Responsibility in Global Value Chains: Where Are We Now
and Where Are We Going?, 123 J. BUS. ETHICS 11, 12 (2014).

150. Sethi, supra note 147, at 7-8.
151. See generally Luc Fransen, Multi-stakeholder Governance and Voluntary
Programme Interactions:Legitimation Politics in the InstitutionalDesign of Corporate
Social Responsibility, 10 SOCIO-ECON. REV. 163 (2012) (comparing the legitimacy of
multi-stakeholder and business driven initiatives).
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IV. COSMOPOLITAN CONSUMER CITIZENSHIP

The previous Part reviewed the consumer countermovement
against labor violations in the supply chain, and the lead firms'
responses to it. This Part focuses more closely on ethically minded
consumers, analyzing them in the theoretical framework of citizenship.
This particular subsection of consumers is referred to as "cosmopolitan
citizen-consumers," or those who practice a form of cosmopolitan
consumer citizenship. Other scholars have alternatively described this
152
form of market-based engagement as conscientious consumerism,
15 3
The nomenclature
ethical consumerism, or political consumerism.
often reflects the geography of its users, with Europeans preferring
political consumerism, for example. But it also reflects the conceptual
154
For this Article, the term "consumer
framework used by its adopters.
citizenship" is chosen because consumers who make purchasing
choices informed by a political ideal and desire to connect with
producers are engaging in a form of activity that is consonant with
cosmopolitan ideas of citizenship.
A. From TraditionalCitizenship ...
In order to understand how cosmopolitan consumer citizenship is
constituted, and how it functions as a regulatory force, it is important
to first discuss what is meant by citizenship. Citizenship is the political
notion that one has both rights and duties as a member of a defined
55
political body-generally a nation-state.1 A classic delineation is that
56
between liberal and republican conceptions.1 In liberal conceptions of
citizenship, the emphasis is placed on the legal rights that the citizen
57
possesses vis-at-vis the state or political regime.1 The emphasis, as is
reflected in liberal constitutionalism, for example, is on ensuring that
private citizens are extended legal rights and protection from
58
In republican
infringement into the private sphere by government.1
conceptions, on the other hand, the emphasis is generally placed on the
duties one has to participate in the decision-making of the political
body.' 59 Alternatively, as the political philosopher Jurgen Habermas
conceptualizes it, republican citizenship is a "model of received
152. See TIM BARTLEY ET AL., LOOKING BEHIND THE LABEL: GLOBAL INDUSTRIES
AND THE CONSCIENTIOUS CONSUMER 1 (Ind. Univ. Press 2015). Bartley et al., for

example, prefer the term "conscientious consumerism" because they are skeptical of the
degree to which consumer choice in the market rises to the level of a political act.
153. MICHELETTI & STOLLE, supra note 102, at 39 (describing political
consumerism as individualized responsibility-taking).
154. See BARTLEY ET AL., supra note 152, at 7.
155. Michael Walzer, Citizenship, in POLITICAL INNOVATION AND CONCEPTUAL
CHANGE 211 (Terence Ball et al. eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1989).
156. Id. at 216.
157. Id. at 214-16.
158. Id. at 215.
159. Id.
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membership in a self-determined ethical community." 160 But some
scholars, such as Michael Walzer, have noted that the dichotomy
between republican and liberal notions is somewhat false: a citizen
cannot secure rights without participating in the political processes
that define and institutionally protect that citizen. 161
Another way of thinking about citizenship-one that centers on
notions of social citizenship in relationship to the capitalist state-was
articulated by T.H. Marshall in his seminal essay On Citizenship and
Social Class. Marshall argued that there has been a progression in
modern democratic capitalist states of the meaning and types of
citizenship. 162 In the first stage, "civil" citizenship was extended to
those members of society that were deemed citizens-generally
landowning men-as a means of protecting their "individual
freedom." 163 These rights included property rights, freedom of thought
and speech, and the due process of law. 164 In the second stage,
"political" citizenship was extended to groups of people to enable
participation in political decision-making and to build political power
through voting rights. 165 Marshall then identified a third stage of
citizenship that emerged in the twentieth century-"social"
citizenship. 166 Social citizenship entails the range of rights that a
citizen accrues for a "modicum of economic welfare and security to the
right to ... live the life of a civilized being according to the standards
prevailing in the society."1 67 Such rights, as Polanyi argued, become
necessary to maintain the stability and legitimacy of capitalism. 168
Marshall's conception of citizenship is consistent with what some have
termed the "unitary" or traditionally liberal conception, in which all
members of a polity are accorded the same civil, political, and social
rights regardless of their position or status, assuming of course that
they meet the political criteria of "citizen" in a given nation.1 69

160. Jurgen Habermas, Citizenship and National Identity: Some Reflection on the
Futureof Europe, in THE CONDITION OF CITIZENSHIP 25-26 (Bart Van Steenbergen ed.,

1992). Specifically, Habermas understands the republican strain of citizenship to be such
that "citizens are integrated into the political community like parts into a whole; that is,
in such a manner that they can only form their personal and social identity in the horizon
of shared traditions and intersubjectively recognized institutions."
161. Walzer, supra note 155, at 217 ("the security provided by the authorities
cannot just be enjoyed; it must be secured, and sometimes against the authorities
themselves.").
162. See T.H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class, in CITIZENSHIP AND SOCIAL
CLASS AND OTHER ESSAYS 1, 10 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1950).

163.
164.
165.
166.

Id.
See id. at 10-11.
See id. at 11.
See id.

167.
168.

Id.
See KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION:

THE POLITICAL AND

ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF OUR TIME 79-80 (2d ed. 2001) (discussing the double movement).
169. Dominique Leydet, Citizenship, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Oct. 13,
2006),
http://plato.stanford.edulentries/citizenship/
[https://perma.cc/93H7-H8ZS]
(archived Sept. 15, 2019).
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The unitary, nation-state centric, and liberal conception of
citizenship has come under increasing scrutiny, however, in recent
years. Recognizing the limitation of a unitary perspective, scholars
have identified and argued for alternative forms of citizenship, using
the concept to serve as a means of identifying rights and privileges of
individuals and groups, particularly women, minority groups, and
migrants, that have been excluded from the traditional institutions
and conceptions of citizenship.170 For example, feminist critiques of
citizenship have focused on what feminist scholars consider to be a
false divide between private and public spheres that undergird liberal
conceptions of citizenship.171 Radical feminist critiques have
accordingly argued for far-reaching extensions of public power into
traditionally private spheres in order to remedy the forms of inequality
172
Other critiques of
that are reified in private gender relationships.
and republican
liberal
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that
argue
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to
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diverse
view,
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minority
overlapping
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equal
to
have
order
in
consideration
special
given
are
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such
that
traditionally
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that
bodies
in
political
status
and
opportunities
excluded them.1 74 Critics, however, argue that this kind of "special
treatment" undermines the universalism and egalitarianism before the
75
law underlying traditional liberal understandings of citizenship.'
A third critique of the traditional liberal conception of citizenshipa critique that is particularly pertinent to this Article's discussionchallenges the notion that citizenship is necessarily bounded and
defined by the nation-state.1 76 For proponents of a state-centric
conception of citizenship, citizens act qua citizens not only for their own
77
Citizenship
benefit, but also for the benefit of the political collective.'
one, and
a
bounded
as
collective
political
the
defines
traditionally
8
argue,
advocates
17
Otherwise,
nation-state.
of
a
borders
the
by
usually
social
every
bringing
overinclusive,
be
would
of
citizenship
the notion
170. Id.
171. The public private divide is the Aristotelian notion that the private sphere
must be organized to ensure that citizens (male and property owning) can participate in
politics. The home must be organized to facilitate this, which means ensuring that
women will provide for the home and not have access to work or political power outside
of it. See Jeff Weintraub, The Theory and Politics of the Public/PrivateDistinction, in
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE IN THOUGHT AND PRACTICE: PERSPECTIVES ON A GRAND DICHOTOMY

29-30 (Jeff Weintraub & Krishan Kumar eds., 1997).
172.

See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 1, 96-97 (Harv. Univ.

Press 1988).
173. Leydet, supra note 169, § 2.1.
174. Id.
175. See id.
176.

See DAVID I. MILLER, CITIZENSHIP AND NATIONAL IDENTITY 1, 82 (2000)

(arguing that citizenship must be bounded within the "boundaries of national political
communities").
177. Id.
178. See, e.g., id. at 81.
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relationship within its umbrella and rendering the concept somewhat
meaningless.17 9 Citizenship, moreover, also suggests other kinds of
mutual identification with fellow citizens in that bounded
community. 18 0 That is, for citizenship to function (i.e. if citizens are to
respect their duties in conjunction with the extension of rights) there
must be some shared values and social engagement with other
citizens. 181
For those who wish to expand the nation-state bounded conception
of citizenship, the argument is that many contemporary regulatory and
social problems are ones that are not limited by, or solvable within,
traditional nation-state boundaries. 182 These include, but are not
limited to, environmental degradation, economic crisis, and the
changing nature of security threats.1 83 Indeed, if citizenship is to be
understood as a mix of civil, political, and social rights and duties, then
many of these rights and duties cannot be protected or exercised solely
in the boundaries of the nation-state. In an increasingly transnational
economy, human rights violations can be caused by a complex and
interconnected set of actors. Thus, as David Held writes, "[in] our
increasingly interconnected world, these global problems cannot be
solved by any one nation-state acting alone. They call for collective and
collaborative action."1 84 This is because the contemporary nation-state
is insufficiently equipped to address these transnational economic and
social regulatory challenges and problems.1 8 5 The nation-state is
limited in its ability to adequately address extraterritorial activity
because the conduct or injuries in question often take place and have
causal chains that span across jurisdictions.1 86 This is a wellrecognized problem among scholars of global regulation and
governance. 87
B.... To Consumer Citizenship
Thus, while traditional theories of citizenship and democratic
participation are limited in their capacity to address some
transnational challenges, including labor rights and standards in
global supply chains, contemporary scholarship on citizenship opens
up theoretical space to exercise citizenship in nontraditional arenas.
179.
180.
(2007).
181.
182.

Id. at 10.
Jennifer Gordon, TransnationalLabor Citizenship, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 503, 514
MILLER, supra note 176, at 10.
See DAVID HELD, COSMOPOLITANISM: IDEALS AND REALITIES 4 (2010).

183. See id.
184. Id.
185. See id.
186. Id.
187. See, e.g., Burkard Eberlein et al., Transnational Business Governance
Interactions:Conceptualization and Framework for Analysis, 8 REG. & GOVERNANCE 1
(2014) (discussing the interaction of non-state actors and states in the regulation of
market activities that cross borders).
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These include in the market, and not just in domestic, public
parliamentary or legislative institutions. Expanding the realm of
citizenship will provide greater opportunities for political engagement
in a greater number of deliberative spaces that might be more effective
in addressing transnational regulatory problems. To do so, citizens
must be engaged in multiple arenas that engage the multiple aspects
of their lives as they are led in the day to day. Indeed, citizens inhabit
many different spheres including at work, at home, with friends, or in
their communities. They thus have multiple identities and operate in
different domains of action.
One of the most important of such identities is citizens' identity as
consumers. While few people in society actively engage in traditional
forms of politics in a sustained way, either at the local or national
levels, nearly everyone engages in acts of consumption almost every
day. This means that consumption, which is generally practiced at the
level of the market, is a potentially powerful means of expressing
political and moral preferences. Consumption thus transforms from an
activity solely aimed at satisfying one's immediate needs and desires,
to one that provides opportunities to express social and political
preferences, and to make an impact on the world. Consumption, in this
perspective, should thus be understood to be expressive of political
ideals, and to be a form of action. As Frank Trentmann argues, rather
than occupying "opposing spheres of public and private," consumption
and citizenship are "today increasingly recognized as porous, indeed
overlapping domains."18 8 And for some, everyday goods can be an object
deepening
and
"shaping
humanitarianism,
of consumers'
citizenship."189
What results is the concept of consumer citizenship, which, in the
context of the global economy, is necessarily grounded in a
transnational context. As Jose6 Johnston argues, one must broaden the
"meaning of citizenship beyond the state-container of formal politics to
encompass citizenship's political-economic and political-ecological
dimensions."1 9 0 Accordingly, she views "the citizen as part of collective
struggles to reclaim and preserve the social and ecological
commons."1 91 In consumer citizenship, political activity occurs at the
site of consumption and through market transactions. In short, as
defined by Michele Micheletti and Dietlind Stolle, consumer
188. Frank Trentmann, Citizenship and Consumption, 7 J. CONSUMER CULTURE
147, 147 (2007). But for an analysis about how these ideal types are inherently
conflicting, see Jos~e Johnston, The Citizen-Consumer Hybrid: Ideological Tensions and
the Case of Whole Foods Market, 37 THEORY & Soc'Y 229, 241-48 (2008). But for a
skeptical view of consumer citizenship campaigns, see generally ETHEL BROOKS,
UNRAVELING THE GARMENT INDUSTRY: TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZING AND WOMEN'S

WORK (Bert Klandermans et al. eds., 2007).
189. Michele Micheletti, The Moral Force of Consumption and Capitalism, in
CITIZENSHIP AND CONSUMPTION 121, 122 (Kate Soper & Frank Trentmann eds., 2008).
190. Johnston, supra note 188, at 243.
191. Id.
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citizenship is the "consumers' use of the market as an arena for politics
in order to change institutional or market practices found to be
ethically, environmentally, or politically objectionable."' 9 2
To illustrate the political nature of consumer activity, this Article
turns to Iris Marion Young. Young has made one of the most widely
cited arguments for how consumption is inherently a political act that
carries with it political duties and obligations, particularly as applied
to labor in global supply chains.19 3 Specifically, she proposes a "social
connection model of responsibility," whereby individuals "bear
responsibility for structural injustice because they contribute by their
actions to the processes that produce unjust outcomes."1 94 If
consumers' lives are embedded in the web of structural relations that
require the labor of workers in global supply chains, then, Young
argues, nation-state-based conceptions of citizenship are no longer
helpful in allocating or bounding political responsibility. 9 5 Her
argument is that consumers' actions are part of a causal chain that
affects workers' rights in supply chains, and that makes consumers
"structurally" responsible for the conditions in which they work.1 96
But while some view consumer citizenship as a politically
legitimate and potentially effective means of effecting social change in
the global economy, others argue that consumer citizenship is
theoretically problematic.' 9 7 One argument is that, by focusing on
consumerism as the key to social change, the ecologically important
goal of reducing consumption is de-emphasized.1 9 s The potential of
consumer citizenship as a form of social change is thus inherently
limited because it valorizes and legitimizes the market and capitalist
forms of economic organization that might be the source of the
problems in the first place. While this might be true in the case of
environmental stewardship, this argument is perhaps less applicable
to the question of labor and human rights, where the concern is less on
reducing consumption and more on improving the conditions under
which production for consumption occurs.
A second argument is that consumer citizenship might be contrary
to notions of equal citizenship and constitute a threat to democracy. 199
This is because it relies on a form of political participation that is
192.

MICHELETTI & STOLLE, supra note 102, at 39.
193. Iris M. Young, Responsibility and Global Justice:A Social ConnectionModel,
12 SOc. PHIL. & POL'Y. 102, 119 (2006).
194. Id.
195. Id. Others argue that cosmopolitan notions of justice are in fact too expansive
to be meaningful and might result in less robust democratic functioning. Bellamy argues,
for example, that this expansive notion of citizenship diminishes the opportunity for real
democratic participation, in favor of a world polis that is constituted by individual
interactions. See RICHARD BELLAMY, CITIZENSHIP: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 91-92

(Oxford Univ. Press 2008).
196. Young, supra note 193, at 102-03.
197.
198.

See generally BARTLEY ET AL., supra note 152.
Id. at 18.

199. Id. at 71.
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20 0
One dollar
dependent on the number of dollars one has to spend.
20 1
As a result, those with the most dollars
equals one vote, so to speak.
to spend on consumption are able to have more political influence than
those with fewer dollars. Others, such as the sociologist Zygmunt
Bauman, claim that "market populists" ignore the contradictory nature
of using markets to achieve equality, because markets themselves are
"factories of social inequality." 202 A response to these equality-centered
critiques is that it is true that those with more money to spend will
potentially have more power to exert their will, including over
producers. But if that power is in fact wielded to redistribute more
power and dollars to producers, then capitalism's tendency to increase
economic inequality can in fact be tempered while at the same time
achieving the potential of capitalism to increase the wealth and wellbeing of global producers. As for the inequality of political power
between consumers with various resource endowments (versus
inequality between consumers and producers), again, that inequality
is not intuitively disturbing if consumers with more to spend choose to
spend it toward ends that are aimed to benefit producers.
A third critique is that consumer citizenship is a form of political
action that is intrinsically individualistic, and as a political practice it
might displace or crowd out collective political action, which is
arguably a more effective means of effecting sustainable political
change. 203 But in a widely cited article from political science literature,
Margaret M. Willis and Juliet B. Schor argue, based on empirical
evidence, that individual acts of political consumption do not
undermine, displace, or substitute for conventional collective and
204
political activism and engagement.
Consumer citizenship is not only of interest to scholars, however.
Transnational labor activists who seek to mobilize global consumers to
pressure lead firms to govern their supply chains also find the merged
citizen-consumer appealing and see it as an idea that can help mobilize
consumers. An example of this revealed itself in the wake of the Rana
Plaza collapse in Bangladesh in 2013. Rana Plaza was an industrial
that
different garment factories
building housing several
which
of
a
number
firms,
manufactured apparel for a number of lead
205
The factories were located
were prominent western garment firms.
on several floors, a number of which were built without permits and

200. Id. at 71-72
201. Id.
202. Zygmunt Bauman, Exit Homo Politicus, Enter Homo Consumens, in
CITIZENSHIP AND CONSUMPTION 139, 142 (Kate Soper & Frank Trentmann eds., Palgrave
Macmillan 2007). But see MICHELETTI & STOLLE, supra note 102, at 126-29 (arguing the
market logic of capitalism helped the anti-slavery movement).
203. Bauman, supra note 202, at 73-75.
204. Willis & Schor, supra note 9, at 161.
205. Rana Plaza: A man-made disaster that shook the world, CLEAN CLOTHES
CAMPAIGN, https://cleanclothes.org/ua/2013/rana-plaza (last visited Sept. 15, 2019)
[https://perma.cc/2C22-HM28] (archived on Aug. 22, 2019).
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against code. 206 Ignoring warnings from engineers and workers, the
building's owner and factory managers forced workers to go into the
building, and on April 24, 2013, it collapsed, killing 1,138 Bangladeshi
garment workers inside and injuring some 2,600, according to the
Clean Clothes Campaign. 20 7
Soon after the collapse, global unions and workers' rights
organizations mobilized to form an organization independent from the
Bangladeshi government that could monitor and improve safety
conditions in Bangladesh's factories. What formed was the Bangladesh
Fire and Safety Accord (The Accord), which is a union-supported,
multistakeholder effort to get lead firms to ameliorate health and
safety conditions in the factories from which they source. 20 8 To compel
lead firms to join the Accord, an activist organization called
AVAAZ.org, which uses online petitions and mobilization, hosted a
petition to compel companies to join.2 09 The petition read in part:
As citizens and consumers, we urge you to immediately sign an enforceable
Bangladesh fire and building safety agreement, or risk fatal damage to your
brand image. The agreement must commit you to pay for routine, independent
inspections and safety upgrades for your supplier factories. Your companies and
other multinationals profit from cheap labor, and can do much more to reduce
2 10
the dangers of the places where your products are made.

The text of this petition is a nice illustration of how the overlapping
nature of consumption and citizenship noted by Trentmann is utilized
by activists. 2 1 1 It is important

to note

that there are multiple

relationships and connections that are both implied and explicitly
asserted in this petition. 212 One set of relationships exists between
consumers and lead firms, which are the relationships that most
concern firms, and that drive their supply chain practices. 213 A second
set exists between consumers across the globe who are joining a
transnational campaign to effect change in the conduct of
multinational corporations and to assert that lead firms have duties

206. Id. Rana Plaza unfortunately was not the first, or last, of such tragedies.
Factory fires have long been an issue in Bangladesh, and according to the labor rights
group, the Solidarity Center, there were at least 34 deaths and almost 985 injuries due
to factory fires from November 2012 to December 2015. Bangladesh Garment and Textile
Factory Safety Incidents Since Tazreen Fashion Factory Fire, SOLIDARITY CTR. (Dec. 7,
2015),
https://www.solidaritycenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Bangladesh.
Garment-Factory-injury-and-death-fact-sheetl2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WQ2S-P7T8]
(archived on Aug. 22, 2019).
207. Bangladesh Garment and Textile Factory Safety Incidents, supra note 206.
208.

See ACCORD ON FIRE AND BUILDING SAFETY IN BANGLADESH, supranote 112.

209. See AVAAZ, http://www.avaaz.org/en/ (last visited Sept. 15, 2019)
[https://perma.cclUF5S-6ZRA] (archived on Aug. 22, 2019).
210. Id.
211. See Trentmann, supra note 188, at 147.
212. Kolben, TransnationalPrivate LaborRegulation, supra note 25, at 370-71.
213. See supra Part III.C.
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214
A third set of
and obligations toward their suppliers' employees.
relationships exists between consumers and the workers in the supply
chain who are the subjects of this petition. It is these relationships that
this Article is most concerned with. A final set of relationships exists
between the lead firms and the workers-the claim being that
corporations have an obligation toward the workers that produce their
goods, despite the lack of a direct legal-employment relationship
between them. Importantly, the petition does not address other
significant relationships that exist in the global supply chain, but that
are often neglected by scholars and activists. These include the various
forms of relationships that exist between the supply chain workers
themselves, the relationships between workers and their direct
employers, or between workers and the state, for example.
Transnational movements succeed in compelling lead firms to take
action in their supply chains when some or all of these relationships
are made apparent and visceral for citizen-consumers, particularly the
relationship between consumers and workers, and that between
consumers and lead firms. Citizen-consumers must also be made to feel
(1) that they bear ethical and political obligations toward workers, as
Young claims there to be; 215 (2) that they possess power and influence
over companies with whom they do business; and (3) that they share
community and solidarity with other like-minded citizen-consumers.
There are a number of challenges to achieving these conditions,
however. How, for example, can transnational consumer citizenship
effectively function when the boundaries of cosmopolitan citizenship
are so geographically large? How can any sense of responsibility, duty,
or obligation be internalized when the relationships just described are
seemingly so tenuous? And finally, the question to which we turn next,
to what degree do citizen-consumers actually care and engage in
political activity through the market? While these questions and
potential critiques of consumer citizenship must at least be
acknowledged and addressed, at the same time they cannot serve to
negate the whole project just because the questions require continued
examination.

C. Empirics: To What Degree do Consumers Care?
As the world economy has unbundled, and as labor governance
deficits have been exposed, a remarkable parallel change in the way
that corporations qua lead firms govern labor conditions in their supply
chains can be observed. 216 These changes are driven in large part by
the threat and fear that citizen-consumers, mobilized and informed by
214. See Deirdre Shaw, Consumer Voters in Imagined Communities, 27 INTL J.
SOC. & Soc. POL'Y 135 (2007) (describing an imagined community of like-minded
consumers who are consuming based on ethical criteria).
215. See Young, supra note 193, at 119.
216. See supra Part III.D.
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TLANs and by the media, will punish firms in the marketplace for poor
labor rights in their supply chains. 2 17 This is especially true for those
whose brands and reputations are vulnerable to the pressures and
spotlights of TLANs and consumers. 218
But to what degree are consumers in fact observably motivated to
purchase products based on labor and other social criteria? And what
informs these decisions? In other words, are consumers acting as
citizen-consumers, or just as plain, old consumers, maximizing value
and minimizing cost? If consumer citizenship is in fact a potentially
powerful tool in the supply chain governance tool kit, then scholars and
policy makers need to understand how consumers behave in theory and
in practice. They must (1) understand to what degree consumers are in
fact motivated to purchase products based on labor and other social
criteria; and (2) understand what the drivers are that might
emotionally or intellectually move a consumer to take into
consideration social criteria when they purchase a product.
1. Survey Research
The first way in which empirical researchers investigate these
questions is through surveys that ask consumers about their intention
and actual action. This line of research appears to support the
proposition that there is a fair amount of consumer desire, at least in
the abstract, to purchase goods based on ethical and political
considerations, and not just based on minimizing cost. But, of course,
that desire is nuanced and contingent on certain factors. According to
research conducted and reviewed by Richard Freeman and Kimberly
Elliott, for example, consumers report in surveys that they are willing
to pay more for products that they are told are made in good
conditions. 219 Of course, like most things, this is price contingentthose same consumers report a sharply decreasing willingness to
purchase products that are made in good conditions as the price
increases. 220 On the other hand, when consumers are told that a t-shirt
is made in bad conditions, they report being less willing to buy that tshirt, even if given a discount on that item. 221 In other words, from the

lead firm's perspective, making products in exceptional labor
conditions provides limited value, but being publicly exposed for
sourcing products made in bad conditions can have potentially
damaging effects.
217. See supra Part III.C.
218. Drusilla Brown, Rajeev Dehejia & Raymond Robertson, Is There a Business
Case for Improving Labor Standards?Some Evidence From Better FactoriesCambodia,
in WORKERS' RIGHTS AND LABOR COMPLIANCE IN GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAINS: IS A SOCIAL

LABEL THE ANSWER? 69, 82 (Jennifer Bair et al. eds., Routledge 2013).
219.

KIMBERLY ANN ELLIOTT & RICHARD B. FREEMAN, CAN LABOR STANDARDS

IMPROVE UNDER GLOBALIZATION? 34-35 (Peterson Inst. for Int'l Econ. 2003).
220. Id.
221. Id.
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Other survey research has also found extensive support among
consumers in the United States and Europe for buying products that
are made in ethical and sweatshop-free conditions. Shareen Hertel et
al surveyed 508 respondents in the United States and asked how much
they would be willing to pay for a sweater made in non-sweatshop
conditions. 222 The researchers found that "[a] sizable majority (62
percent) report that they are willing to pay at least five dollars more,
and more than one-third of Americans report that they would be
willing to spend 10 dollars more." 223 A similar result was obtained for
fair trade coffee consumption. 224 That is, the authors reported that
according to their surveys "more than 75 percent of coffee buyers would
be willing to pay at least 50 cents more per pound for fair-trade, while
225
more than half would pay a premium of one dollar or more."
Stolle and Micheletti, drawing on surveys in the European Social
Survey (2003) and the Citizenship, Involvement, and Democracy
Survey in the US (2006), surveyed self-reported political activity by
226
According to these
consumers in the course of consumer activity.
surveys, about 31 percent of people surveyed reported engaging in
22 7
In Sweden, approximately
either "buycotting," boycotting, or both.
60 percent of respondents reported doing so, and in the United States,
28 percent. 228 While boycotting is the refusal to buy a good from a
company because of its practices, "buycotting" is the use of labels or
other forms of information about a good to affirmatively seek that
product and company out and purchase the good as a means of
22 9
rewarding that company's good behavior.

Some scholars have argued that the methods used in many of these
surveys are poorly designed, and thus overly estimate consumers'
willingness to pay. 2 30 They argue that there is a discrepancy between
what consumers profess to wish to do in surveys, and what they do in
practice. 231 Some attribute this in part to consumers creating
justificatory stories that rationalize their decisions not to purchase
222. C. Patrick Heidkamp et al., Human Rights and Public Opinion: From
Attitudes to Action, 124 POL. Scl. Q. 443, 448 (2009).
223. Id. at 455.
224. Id.
225. This is not insignificant given that between 2001 and 2005 the authors report
that the average price of a pound of coffee was $3 per pound. Id.
226. MICHELETI & STOLLE supra note 102, at 95.
227. Id. at 68.
228. Id. at 97.
229. See id. at 40.
230. Pat Auger & Timothy M. Devinney, Do What Consumers Say Matter? The
Misalignment of Preferences with UnconstrainedEthical Intentions, 76 J. Bus. ETHICS
361, 365 (2007).
231. See Michael J. Carrington, Benjamin A. Neville & Gregory J. Whitwell, Why
Ethical Consumers Don't Walk Their Talk: Toward a Framework for Understandingthe
Gap Between the EthicalPurchase Intentions and Actual Buying Behaviour of Ethically
Minded Consumers, 97 J. BUS. ETHICS 139, 139 (2010) (citing to one study indicating that
while 30% of consumers state they would purchase ethically, only 3% of consumers
actually do so).
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according to their beliefs. 232 Others go so far as to argue that "ethical
consumerism" is in practice largely a "myth," and that, in fact,
consumers generally do not make purchasing decisions based on
ethical criteria. 233
Another question examined through survey research concerns
what motivates and drives consumers to make politically and ethically
driven consumption purchases. Lyle Scruggs et al., argue that political
consumerism is "surprisingly widespread," and is more often engaged
in by individuals who are "more disaffected with traditional political
institutions of authority." 234 They find that the "likelihood of engaging
in political consumption increases significantly alongside a person's
level of concern about a problem, the perceived importance of
individual consumption in causing that problem, and information
about how related goods are produced." 235 Psychological motivations
can also play a role. For example, some research suggests that
consumers are motivated by defining and distinguishing themselves
through their identification with certain companies that are thought to
be socially responsible. 236
2. Experimental Research
A second stream of research attempts to go beyond surveys and
gauge actual consumer behavior through field and lab experiments,
and some of these field experiments do, in fact, suggest that consumers
are willing to pay somewhat more for goods that they are told are made
in better working conditions. In a study by Jens Hainmueller and
Michael J. Hiscox, the authors compelled the United States-based
retailer Gap Inc., which owns the retail brand Banana Republic, to
allow an experiment in Banana Republic outlet stores.2 3 7 Researchers
conducted a study in 111 Banana Republic outlet stores in thirty-eight
states over a period of four weeks. 238 Researchers placed two different
signs over three different clothing items in Banana Republic stores: a
$130 women's suit, an $18 women's yoga pant, and a $12 men's tshirt. 239 One sign emphasized the fashion aspects of the product, but
232. See Russell Belk, Timothy M. Devinney, & Giana M. Eckhardt, Why Don't
Consumers Consume Ethically?, 9 J. CONSUMER BEHAV. 426, 428 (2010).
233. See PAT AUGER, TIMOTHY M. DEVINNEY, & GIANA M. ECKHARDT, THE MYTH
OF THE ETHICAL CONSUMER 4 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2010).

234. Samuel J. Best et al., Information, Choice and PoliticalConsumption:Human
Rights in the Checkout Lane, 33 HUM. RTs. Q. 1092, 1095 (2011).
235.

Id.

236. See Longinos Marin et al., The Role of Identity Salience in the Effects of
Corporate Social Responsibility on Consumer Behavior, 84 J. Bus ETHICS 65, 65-66;
(2009).
237. Jens Hainmueller & Michael J. Hiscox, The Socially Conscious Consumer?
Field Experimental Tests of Consumer Support for FairLabor Standards 8 (MIT Pol. Sci.
Dep't Working Paper No. 2012-15, 2012).
238. Id.
239. Id.
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stated nothing about labor conditions. 240 The other emphasized the
company's commitment to promote fair and safe working conditions
2 41
The
and stated that consumers can "feel good about what you wear."
researchers found that the signs promoting good labor conditions in the
production of women's suits significantly boosted sales of that item. 242
But shoppers in the market for the lower cost items showed no
statistically significant inclination to spend more on items made in
good conditions. 24 3 The researchers concluded that their findings
confirmed what many surveys suggest, that at least some segments of
shoppers-here women looking for higher price items-are in fact
willing to choose items, all things being equal, that are indicated to
have high labor standards. 244 Importantly, the authors made no claims
as to what exactly motivates buyers. 245 But regardless of motivations,
it seems that such criteria are increasingly becoming part of the factors
that lead to purchasing decisions.
It is important to emphasize that the study tested the effects of
marketing clothing that are described as being made in good
conditions. It did not test what would happen if consumers were told
that clothing were made in bad conditions, or in conditions that might
even shock the conscience, such as slavery or child labor. Would
consumer behavior be consistent with the survey evidence of Freeman
and Elliott? 246 It is likely, given the degree to which many image

sensitive corporations have implemented supply chain governance
regimes, that many, although certainly not all, consumers would make
alternative purchasing decisions, and this intuition that companies
will be punished in the marketplace for abuses in its supply chain is
likely shared by many managers. 247 In an interview with Der Spiegel,
for example, the CEO of the Germany-based Otto Group, which is one
of the world's largest online retailers, confirms this intuition. Despite
his personal commitment to sustainability issues and his own
company's tradition of "social conscience," he chooses not to highlight
his company's social and environmental efforts in his company's
communications. This is because he believes "that you won't
necessarily be rewarded by customers and markets just because you're
making more of an effort than your competitors. . . but you will be
248
punished if you make a mistake."

240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.

Id. at 9.
Id. at 21-22.
Id. at 13.
Id.
Id.
Id.

246.

See ELLIOTT & FREEMAN, supra note 219, at 34-35.

247. Markus Brauck et al., Buying Better: The Impossible Challenge of Ethical
Shopping, SPIEGEL ONLINE (Apr. 18, 2015), http://www.spiegel.de/internationalhow-we28 29 8
.html [https://perma.cclR59U-7DT5] (archived
can-become-ethical-consumers-a-10
on Aug. 22, 2019).
248.

Id.
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Indeed, in a study conducted by Retail Week in May 2013
following the Rana Plaza disaster, 35 percent of consumers reported
being either a little or a lot more likely to ask retailers about where
their clothing was produced, while 44 percent claimed it made no
difference. 249 Thirty-five percent of consumers is not an insignificant
number, and retailers would surely take note. And it is for this reason
that the major brands are primarily focused on preventing bad
publicity, rather than promoting exceptionally good conditions and
respect of rights in their factories. 25 0
Moreover, individuals can be subtly influenced by brand
reputation and image in ways that they are not consciously aware. 251
If company X's reputation is being harmed, for example, because of
negative coverage of its supply chain labor practices, this might have
unconscious effects on consumer sentiments about that company. The
expression of this sentiment, however, might not be consciously
expressed in terms of labor rights preferences, but rather in terms of
aesthetics or in terms of perception of quality. For brands that are
particularly image conscious, or that are highly sensitive to popular
cultural sentiments of being "cool," these perceptions can be very
important. For companies that are less brand sensitive, however, such
as multibrand retailers like Walmart and Target that source and sell
items under different generic brand names, and that compete based on
price, consumer perceptions might be less important. 252
One of the most interesting experimental results, albeit in lab, not
field, conditions, is reported by Mark Pigors and Bettina
Rockenbach. 253 Like other researchers, the authors find that under
experimental conditions, consumers are indeed generally price
sensitive, but that when the right balance is reached between price and
social responsibility, which in their experiment the authors uniquely
define to mean producer wage levels, consumers do take wage levels
into consideration as a decision criterion. 254 But what is particularly
interesting are the authors' conclusions related to what they refer to as
"social distance" and direct communication. 255 The authors look at
willingness to pay with two measures: one by managers and one by
consumers. 256 In the first finding, the authors find that in
249. John A. Quelch & Margaret L. Rodriguez, Rana Plaza: Workplace Safety in
Bangladesh, 4 Harv. Bus. Sch. Case 514-034 (Sept. 2013).
250. ELLIorr & FREEMAN, supra note 219, at 45.
251. See, e.g., Neale Martin & Kyle Morich, Unconscious Mental Processes in
Consumer Choice: Toward a New Model of Consumer Behavior, 18 J. BRAND MGMT. 483,
483 (2011) (describing the unconscious roots of most consumer behavior).
252. The connection between price point and consumer commitment to ethical
consumption is illustrated by the experiment by Hainmueller and Hiscox. See
Hainmueller & Hiscox, supra note 237.
253. Mark Pigors & Bettina Rockenbach, Consumer Social Responsibility, 62
MGMT. SCI. 3123, 3124 (2016).
254. Id.
255. Id. at 3131.
256. Id. at 3125.
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experimental conditions, managers choose to pay higher wages to
workers in competitive environments when there is direct
communication between workers and consumers about the satisfaction
257
level workers have about those wages. According to the authors, the
reasons that managers pay the higher wages is because "direct
communication between workers and consumers reduces the social
distance and triggers social concerns of the consumers for the workers,
2 58
The authors go on
which results in higher wages for the workers."
to report that, "[m]oreover, explicitly showing the satisfaction of
workers may reduce the uncertainty of whether or not the wage is
acceptable for the worker and thus reduces the consumers' 'moral
wiggle room."' 259 That is, managers recognize or perhaps imagine
direct communication between workers and consumers to be a powerful
tool, and thus pay higher wages to the workers in order to make them
happy for instrumental reasons-increasing sales.
The authors also investigated consumer willingness to pay for
260
The authors
goods made by workers that are paid higher wages.
found that in conditions of producer competition (i.e. when there is
price competition) consumers are willing to pay more for a good when
there is some indication that workers are paid higher wages, whether
26 1
Moreover,
through a label or when there is complete transparency.
when there is direct communication between workers and consumers
regarding workers' satisfaction with their wages, then consumers are
262
While this still only
most willing to pay more for those goods.
constitutes about 28 percent of buyers, it is still a significant number,
263
And generally speaking, when there are not
even if relatively small.

significant price differences between products that are differentiated
by higher and lower wage workers, consumers will generally choose to
264
The authors also
buy the product made in higher wage conditions.
gave support to the business case for socially responsible production,
finding that producers will achieve higher sales and "significantly
higher profits" in competitive environments where prices are not
different, but where the product is differentiated by higher wage
levels. 265
257. Id.
258. Id. at 3131.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 3133.
261. Id.
262. As the authors put it, "[w]hen suppliers compete ... we find that consumers
take SR in production as a decision criterion and go for the SR-produced good whenever
the price premium for SR is not too high." Id. at 3124.
263. Id. at 3133. Specifically, the authors claim that consumers will purchase from
the higher price firm 27.8% of the time when there is direct communication between
workers and producers indicate that they are happy with their wages.
264. Id. ("Thus, it seems that consumers follow a lexicographic decision
rule: the first priority is to buy cheap, but if prices do not differ too much, the
worker's wage guides the decision.").
265. Id. at 3134.
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The degree to which consumers will in fact engage in ethical
consumption practices, and in what contexts, is thus still a matter of
debate and requires more research. 266 But the discussion above
demonstrates that, despite the legitimate questions about the degree
to which consumers care or will act on their beliefs, a substantial
number are indeed motivated by specific commitments to improving
the plight of workers. These commitments might range from seeking
out products made in good conditions ("buycotting"), to taking direct
action in a protest, or signing a petition. Others will consciously boycott
or subconsciously avoid purchasing from companies that are actively
shown to source from factories where certain kinds of poor labor
conditions exist. Whatever the degree to which this is the case, certain
image-sensitive companies try to avoid labor conditions in their supply
chains that would, if exposed, reflect poorly on their brand image and
potentially their bottom lines. Moreover, there is evidence that both
consumers and managers are affected when social distance between
workers and consumers is decreased. If the law is to be a tool to reduce
social distance and thus help improve conditions in global supply
chains, how both social distance and the consumer imaginary function
needs to be fleshed out.

V. THE CONSUMER IMAGINARY

The discussion in the prior Part asked to what degree consumers
care about how their goods are made. It concluded that a significant
number do, or would in the right circumstances, take into account such
considerations in their purchasing decisions. This Part turns to a more
conceptual reflection on the nature of consumer citizenship, building
on the notion of social distance introduced above, and proposing that
the notion of the "consumer imaginary" is a helpful way of
conceptualizing the nature of the consumer-producer relationship.
A. Social Distance in the Supply ChainEconomy
For sociologists and social theorists, the concept of social distance
describes the degree to which people are willing and able to accept and
include those who belong to other social groups based on race, social
class, and nationality, to name a few differentiators. 267 While social
distance has been used most commonly to describe social relations
between people who might have some relative geographic proximity
but that experience social distance from each other, 268 scholars
increasingly use the term to also describe social relations between
266. Id.
267. See Williams, supra note 23 (tracing the development of the term social
distance to the sociologist Georg Simmel in 1923).
268. Id.
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various actors in the global economy who experience both social as well
269
as physical distance.
Social distance has been highlighted by some scholars for the role
it plays in various private supply chain labor initiatives, and in global
economic relationships more generally. The experimental research
described in the previous Part by Pigors and Rockenbach illustrates
how reducing social distance can affect working conditions in supply
chains by creating closer connections between producers (workers) and
consumers. 270 Other scholarship has argued that reducing social
distance is a goal of Fair Trade Organizations, which certify particular
goods, particularly food items, to comply with various social criteria,
27
and label those goods as meeting the fair trade standards. 1 As Laura
T. Raynolds articulates, Fair Trade serves as a means of shortening
the "social distance between consumers and producers even where the
geographic
substantial
traverse
being exchanged
products
distances." 2 72 For Raynolds, Fair Trade provides an opportunity to
instill what she calls "civic values," such as equality and trust, respect,
and partnership, into traditional trade relationships by severing the
27 3
Further, "Fair
relationship between social distance and geography.
Trade networks support and are supported by heightened concerns
among Northern consumers over global ethics and the rise of 'ethical
consumption' practices where the social relations embodied in
274
particular commodities increasingly shape product choices."
Other scholars have also used the notion of social distance to
describe the nature of relationships in the supply chain economy.
Richard McIntyre, for example, describes social distance as "the social
gap caused by the severing of a direct relationship between the
275
whom McIntyre
producer and the eventual beneficiary of her effort,"
2 76
He applies
acknowledges to be both the lead firm and the consumer.
that concept to the fissured employment relationship, and, drawing on
Adam Smith, suggests that social distance has grown between lead
firms and the workers that actually produce the goods up the supply
269. Id.
270. See Pigors & Rockenbach, supra note 254, at 3123-34.
271. See, e.g., Laura T. Raynolds, Consumer/ProducerLinks in Fair Trade Coffee
Networks, 42 SOCIOLOGIA RURALIs 404, 404 (2002) (investigating how social and spatial
distances may be shortened between Norther consumers and Southern producers); Geoff
Moore, The Fair Trade Movement: Parameters, Issues and Future Research, 53 J. BUs.
ETHICS 73, 81-82 (2004) (discussing Raynolds' notion of social distance and emphasizing
the need, from a marketing perspective, for information dissemination to do so); Aimee
Shreck, Just Bananas? Fair Trade Banana Production in the Dominican Republic, 3
INT'L J. Soc. AGRIC. & FOOD 13, 13 (2002) (noting the social distance reducing function
of Fair Trade and investigating the degree to which Fair Trade bananas benefit
Dominican banana producers).
272. Raynolds, supra note 271, at 420.
273. Id. at 410.
274. Id. at 415.
275.

RICHARD P. MCINTYRE, ARE WORKER RIGHTS HUMAN RIGHTS? 43-44 (Univ. of

Mich. Press 2008).
276. See id. at 34-44.
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chain. 2 77 Because of this greater social distance, which is exacerbated

by geographic distance, lead firms are more likely to use a "sweating"
model in which wages are driven down as far as possible to maximize
profits. 278
According to McIntyre, the sweating system is facilitated by the
social distance between consumers and lead firm managers who have
fewer sympathetic or empathetic feelings toward workers with whom
they have little direct relationship and who are not direct employees. 279
For McIntyre, then, lead firm managers would be less likely to utilize
a "sweating" model if the social distance between them and the workers
was reduced through direct employment. He is skeptical, however, that
self-regulation can be an effective tool to reduce the "sweating model"
that he argues has become intrinsic to the great unbundling's
organization of production. 280
Like McIntyre, Jan Hudson and Mark Hudson also argue that the
increase in social distance is a central factor in alienating consumers
from the people that make their goods and the conditions they are
made in. Building on Karl Marx's theory of commodity fetishism, they
suggest that "[b]ecause the worker has no direct relationship with the
consumer[s] and is little concerned with their well-being or even their
satisfaction with the product, it is scarcely surprising that the opposite
is also true: that consumers give little thought to the manner in which
the items they consume are produced." 28 1 This is so because although
consumers are bombarded by endless marketing to buy goods and
services, little is known about the processes that went into making
those goods. 282 The ignorance is only exacerbated as production has

&

277. Id. at 45.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 47-48.
280. See id. at 35.
281. Ian Hudson & Mark Hudson, Removing the Veil?: Commodity Fetishism, Fair
Trade, and the Environment, 16 ORG. & ENV'T 413, 416 (2003). Indeed, Karl Marx
remains an essential starting point for any discussion of the relationship between
producers and consumers, for it was Marx who first conceptually unpacked the way in
which the commodity, as he described goods produced for the market, obscures the labor
and the social processes that produce it. See KARL MARX, CAPITAL 81-96 (Dover
Publications 2011) (1867). Marx argued that market forms of production create
commodities that are a kind of mystical object, and he describes "[t]he whole mystery of
commodities, all the magic and necromancy that surrounds the products of labour as
long as they take the form of commodities . . . " Id. at 87. Marx's insight is that labor and
the laborer become hidden behind the commodity form, and the exchange of commodities
masks the social relationships that constitute them. That is, the commodities or goods
mask the humanity that went into manufacturing those goods. From the consumer's
perspective, commodities are experienced as having an almost magical quality. They
exist as things in themselves, severed from the labor, the social relations, and the social
and environmental context that enabled them to be produced. The commodity form
obfuscates the actual labor and labor processes that went into making them, as well as
the economic and personal relationships that structure their production. See Hudson
Hudson, supra note 281, at 416-17 for a discussion.
282. Hudson & Hudson, supra not 281, at 417.
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more
are
dispersed. 2 83 Consumers
globally
more
become
geographically separated from the environmental consequences of
production, as well as the workers who were involved in creating the
good. 284 Processes, consequences, and the humanity of production

become out of sight and out of mind. If production were local, and if
consumers knew the people who manufactured the goods they
consumed and the factories were located in their communities, then
the consumers would have a more visceral and immediate interest in
ensuring that they and their neighbors were treated fairly and that
pollution was mitigated. 285 As Hudson and Hudson write,
When commodities are produced close to where they are sold, as was much more
the case only a few decades ago, the social relations of production are more likely
to be visible. Those that live next to the local garment factory are much more
likely to have some idea about the labor relations that created their T-shirt than
those purchasing commodities involved in the current long-distance production
connections in which corporations subcontract the manufacturing process to
2 86
unknown firms halfway across the world.

To make the point more concretely, the beautiful, shiny Apple
computer seems as if it simply assembled itself out of the magical
ether, rather than assembled by workers at a Foxconn factory in China.
Likewise, it is hard to understand that our crisp new blue jeans that
we picked off the shelves of a retail store were made in a hot factory in
the middle of Jordan by migrant workers in work camp-like
7
conditions.2 8
B. Introducing the Consumer Imaginary
So the problem is clear-there exists social distance between
producers and consumers that is greatly exacerbated by geographic
distance. But short of reorganizing economic production to decrease
geographically exacerbated social distance, is there another way that
scholars and policymakers can conceptualize and address this
problem? The concept of the consumer imaginary can provide some
help. The consumer imaginary is a way of thinking about how
consumers conceptualize and imagine the human beings, the
processes, and the labor that constitute the goods that they consume.
It is imaginary because by and large consumers will never meet or
come into contact with the workers that make the things that they buy.
A particular paradox and challenge of consumer citizenship is that the
nature of many of the multivalent connections that this Article
283. Id. at 418.
284.
285.

Id.
Id.

286. Id.
287. See generally Kevin Kolben, Trade, Development, and Migrant Garment
Workers in Jordan, 5 MIDDLE E.L. & GOVERNANCE 195, 204-17 (2013) (describing the
use and exploitation of migrant workers in Jordan).
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through

consumptive

practices in a globalized economy, are largely imagined.
The concept of the consumer imaginary is influenced by Benedict
Anderson's well-known conception of an imagined community 289 and is
also related to Charles Taylor's notion, building off Anderson, of the
social imaginary. 2 90 Anderson used the concept in the context of
political community in the modern nation-state. 29 1 He argued that a
nation is imagined as a community because, "regardless of the actual
inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is
always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship." 292 Taylor, also
building on Anderson, describes the social imaginary as "the ways
people imagine their social existence, how they fit together with others,
how things go on between them and their fellows, the expectations that
are normally met, and the deeper normative notions and images that
underlie these expectations." 293 Taylor recognizes that narrative and
that "images, stories, and legends" play important roles in the way that
people "imagine their social surroundings." 294
Anderson's conceptualization also resonates with the nature of the
market-based relationships between consumers and producers, among
consumers themselves, 295 as well as even between consumers and lead
firms. 296 The function that imagination plays in

marketing and

consumerism is well recognized. 297 Yet the imagined nature of the
relationship between the consumer and the producer in global supply
chains has not been sufficiently examined, but is nevertheless
apparent. Indeed, most consumers of t-shirts from Bangladesh and
computers assembled in China will never travel to those countries and
will never meet the workers who assembled them. Nor will most of
288.
289.

See supraPart IV.B.
See ANDERSON, supranote 24, at 6-7.

290. See CHARLES TAYLOR, MODERN SOCIAL IMAGINARIES 1, 23 (Duke Univ. Press
2004).
291. See ANDERSON, supra note 24, at 6-7.

&

292. Id. at 7.
293. TAYLOR, supra note 291, at 23.
294. Id.
295. See Shaw, supra note 214, at 140-41 (describing the imagined nature of
consumer communities that engage in political consumerism); Albert M. Muniz, Jr.
Thomas C. O'Guinn, Brand Community, 27 J. CONSUMER RES. 412, 419 (2001) (noting
that brand communities are largely imagined communities).
296. What is meant by this is the way that consumers imagine their relationship
to a brand conscious retailer like Nike or Apple is also imagined in the sense that a brand
is a socially constructed concept without any material or fixed meaning. See Albert M.
Muniz, Jr. & Thomas C. O'Guinn, Collective Brand Relationships, in HANDBOOK OF
BRAND RELATIONSHIPS 173-74 (Deborah J. Maclnnis et al. eds., 2014) (arguing that the
notion of a brand is communally constructed).
297. See Rebecca Jenkins, Elizabeth Nixon & Mike Molesworth, 'JustNormal and
Homely' The Presence, Absence and Othering of Consumer Culture in Everyday
Imagining, 11 J. CONSUMER CULTURE 261, 263 (2011) (citing to Campbell's thesis that
the imagination is largely accountable for driving contemporary consumption by
generating a bridge between the actual dissatisfactory present, and the imagined happy
ideal).
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those workers themselves likely make the journey downstream to the
final destination of the fruit of their travails. Likewise, consumers who
take individual action, such as boycotting, making alternative
purchasing choices, or signing an online petition are imagining their
fellow global consumers as like-minded fellow travelers who share
298
Finally, managers of lead
particular values and act on those values.
firms also imagine, and possibly fear, that their customers will be
citizen-consumers who will potentially take action in certain
circumstances.
Aware of the power of consumers to pressure lead firms and the
new dynamics of consumer citizenship, workers have taken creative
steps to communicate with them about their working conditions. In one
well-publicized case, an inmate at a Chinese labor camp that made
Halloween toys sold at Kmart in the United States enclosed a written
plea to the consumer of the product in hope of communicating with her
about his plight.2 9 9 In another example, a woman who purchased a
jacket at Walmart found a note in Chinese sewn into a jacket that
described terrible working conditions in what might have been a prison
labor camp, or just an abusive factory that was prison-like, including
30 0
fourteen-hour days and beatings.
Whereas labor conditions and the grim reality of the workplace
were once hidden behind the veil of the commodity, new technologies
have enabled workers and consumer movements to make more
transparent the working conditions in factories in far-flung locales, and
even closer to home. 30 1 Like in Anderson's account of the rise of
political nationalism, new technologies of communication and
changing "apprehensions of time" have facilitated these imagined
bonds. 302 Newspapers, videos, the internet, and social media have
made it easier for consumers to imagine relationships and develop
empathy for workers. What transnational activists do, and what
298. See Shaw, supra note 214, at 137-38.
299. See Andrew Jacobs, Behind Cry for Help From China Labor Camp, N.Y.
TIMES, June 11, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/12/worldlasia/man-details-risks[https://perma.cc/6KVUin-exposing-chinas-forced-labor.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0
LWNX] (archived July 31, 2019).
300. See Russ Wiles, Mystery Note in Jacket May Point to China Worker Abuse,
USA TODAY (May 2, 2017, 7:10 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/
2 9
1 820/
business/2017/05/02/mystery-note-jacket-may-point-china-worker-abuse/101
2019).
31,
July
[https://perma.cc/86HH-WPMH] (archived
Worker,
301. See Natalie Kitroeff & Victoria Kim, Behind a $13 shirt, a $6-an-hour
2
L.A. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2017, http://www.latimes.comlprojects/la-fi-forever- 1-factoryworkers/ [https://perma.cclHQ95-CT6V] (archived July 31, 2019) (reporting that in 2016
the U.S. Department of Labor found that 85% of 77 L.A. garment factories inspected
were found to have labor violations, and were ordered to pay $1.3 million in back wages
lost overtime, and damages). For a discussion of how imagined kinship relationships
between Asian designers and their employees and contractors in New York inject social
connection into a hierarchical relationship, see Thuy Linh Nguyen Tu, All in the Family?
Asian American Designers and the Boundaries of Creative Labor, 2 AM. Q. 279, 281
(2010).
302. See ANDERSON, supra note 24, at 32-35.
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companies that utilize social marketing to promote their products do
as well, is to try to promote and forge these imagined relationships in
order to realize their respective objectives. They do so by utilizing
compelling images of workers who, consumers are told, are either
suffering or happy, depending on the objectives of the campaign.
Indeed, the creation and wide diffusion of narratives and images are
important tools that TLANs use to reify for consumers the abstract
concepts of supply chains and the people who work in them. While
garment and apparel production is a trenchant example of this
phenomenon, it is not the only industry in which imagined
communities are exploited-and not in a pejorative sense-to promote
transnational campaigns or corporate marketing.
C. The Consumer Imaginary in Action: Social Labels
One of the most commonly used means of harnessing the consumer
imaginary by transnational activists is through social labels. Of all the
forms of private, market-based regulations, social labels are the most
explicit in using the consumer imaginary. The main goal of a social
label is to "provide an emerging group of ethically conscious consumers
with credible assurances that labeled goods are produced in a manner
consistent with certain social and/or ecological standards."3 0 3 Social
labels that are aimed primarily toward communicating with the end
consumers can be termed "primary labels." 3 04 Social labels are not only
directed toward retail consumers, however. "Secondary Labels" are
business-to-business labels intended to assure firms that the goods and
services they purchase, as intermediate goods or as goods intended for
retail sale, meet the social and ecological standards of their
stakeholders.3 0 5
Social labeling is not a new phenomenon. As scholars have noted,
the first social labels appeared in the late nineteenth century when the
National Consumers League (NCL) issued so-called white labels for
women's white cotton underwear that met certain social and labor
standards. 306 The NCL ended the label in 1918 so as not to compete
with American unions, who denounced the label as being used by
303. JENNIFER BAIR, MARSHA ANN DICKSON, & DOUG MILLER, To Label or Not to
Label: Is that the Question?, in WORKERS' RIGHTS AND LABOR COMPLIANCE IN GLOBAL
SUPPLY CHAINS: IS A SOCIAL LABEL THE ANSWER?, supra note 218, at 1, 4. Social labels

are usually part of certification regimes, often administered by a nonprofit third party,
which provide a verification that a product or a brand corresponds to a given set of
standards. For more on certification and the role it plays in transnational governance,
see Tim Bartley, Certification as a Mode of Social Regulation, in HANDBOOK ON THE
POLITICS OF REGULATION 441 (David Levi-Faur ed., 2011).
304. BAIR, DICKSON, & MILLER, supra note 304, at 5.
305. Id. at 6.
306. Kathryn Kish Sklar, The Consumers' White Label Campaign of the National
Consumers' League, 1998-1918, in GETTING AND SPENDING: EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN
CONSUMER SOCIETIES IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 17-18, 24 (Susan Strasser et al. eds.,

Cambridge Univ. Press 1998).
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antilabor employers.3 0 7 American unions developed their own version
of the social label, which focused primarily on union representation and
was targeted to the working class and union members, in contrast to
the NCL's label, which was primarily targeted at middle-class female
consumers.30 8 By 1908, some sixty-eight unions across the United
3 09
States had adopted a union label.

Examples of social labels include "fair trade" initiatives, such as
the European based Fair Trade International (FI), which certifies
31 0
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What makes some kinds of primary social labels particularly
interesting for the purpose of this Article is their aim to forge a bondalbeit a largely imagined one-between consumers and producers.
Indeed, one of the hallmarks of fair trade organizations, for example,
3 16
is their efforts to personalize the consumer-producer relationship.
If one looks at the websites of these organizations, invariably there will
be links to photos and long descriptions of the producers, often farmers
since food and agriculture are the primary industries in which social
labels are used.3 17 Fl, for example, even allows one to get an RSS feed

307. Id. at 366.
308. See id. at 368-70.
309. Id.
310. See generally Products, FAIRTRADE INT'L, https://www.fairtrade.net/products.
html (last visited Sept. 15, 2019) [https://perma.cclXD4H-RMS5] (archived July 31,
2019).
311. See generally Who We Are, FAMITRADE USA, https://www.fairtradecertified.
org/who-we-are (last visited Sept. 15, 2019) [https://perma.cc/6B3X-WQNQ] (archived
July 31, 2019).
312. See FairtradeStandardfor Hired Labour, FAIRTRADE INT'L 26- 28 (Jan. 15,
https://files.fairtrade.net/standards[HLEN-previous version.pdf
2014),
[https:/perma.cclNV62-5CGC] (archived Sept. 15, 2019).
313. See id. at 23.
314. See id. at 35-37.
INT'L 1-4 (2016),
315. See Fairtrade Textile Production, FAIRTRADE
https://www.fairtrade-deutschland.de/fileadmini/DE/01_was-ist-fairtrade
[https://perma.cc/T2RU03_standards/new_2016 quick guide-textile_1abeling.pdf
2DZF] (archived Sept. 15, 2019).
316. See Raynolds, supra note 271, at 410.
317. See Meet the Producers, FAIRTRADE INT'L, http://www.fairtrade.net/producers/
meet-the-producers.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2019) [https://perma.cc/4EA3-4NEN]
(archived July 31, 2019).
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of new stories about Fair Trade producers.3 1 8 This is an explicit
example of an effort to reduce the social distance between consumers
and producers.
One arena in which the social imaginary is particularly mobilized
is in the growing niche market for high-end coffee that is made in
conditions that meet certain social and environmental standards.
Here, the dominant approach has been FI certification, whereby
consumers are assured that the coffee and teas they consume are
sourced from farms and plantations that meet a minimal set of criteria
that corresponds to consumer intuitions about what constitutes a just
set of economic, environmental, and social arrangements.3 1 9 Another
approach by some boutique coffee companies that are not fair trade
certified has been to describe their sourcing process as "direct trade," 32 0
although many firms are now moving away from that designation. 32 1
Direct trade coffee companies are even more explicit in forging a close,
imagined relationship between consumers and producers. In direct
trade marketing, consumers are provided with narratives about the
coffee growers, albeit usually about the farm owners and not the
workers, and can view pictures and stories about the site from which
their coffee and teas are grown and harvested. 3 22 Here, the economic
relationship is portrayed as existing directly between the coffee
roasters downstream in the supply chain, and the producers, farthest
upstream. To concretize the "direct relationship" in this niche market,
employees of the roaster visit the coffee producers and often claim to
be involved in the growing and processing, serving, in a sense, as
agents of the consumers.323 As one prominent coffee roaster,
Intelligentsia, describes it on its website, "[o]ur buying team travels
the globe and is collectively in the field virtually every day of the year,
sourcing new grower relationships and working with our existing
farmers." 324

318. Id.
319. See Products: Coffee, FAIRTRADE INT'L, https://info.fairtrade.net/product/
coffee (last visited Sept. 15, 2019) [https://perma.cclW25N-534A] (archived Aug. 2, 2019).
320. See Finlay MacGregor et al., Problems with Firm-Led Voluntary
Sustainability Schemes: The Case of Direct Trade Coffee, 9 SUSTAINABILITY 651, 652
(2017) ("Direct trade as a concept for coffee sourcing refers to having direct and regular
contact between roasting firms and coffee producers, which is typically represented by
practices such as coffee buyers from roasting firms visiting coffee producers, with
quality-based prices paid directly to producers.").
321. See id. at 653.
322. See Peter Meehan, To Burundi and Beyond for Coffee's Holy Grail, N.Y.
TIMES,
Sept.
12,
2007,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/12/dining/12coff.html
[https://perma.cclK72B-3L28] (archived Aug. 2, 2019).
323. See Sarah Lyon, FairTrade Coffee and Human Rights in Guatemala, 30 J.
CONSUMER POL'Y 241, 242 (2007) (arguing that coffee roasters act as 'conduits for
consumer actions and intentions).
324. About Us, INTELLIGENTSIA COFFEE, https://www.intelligentsiacoffee.com/
about-us (last visited Sept. 15, 2019) [https://perma.cclA6ZT-WPLS] (archived Aug. 2,
2019).
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The fiction is that consumers, thought the proxies of these roasters,
are made to believe that they are active participants in the sourcing
and production of the coffee itself, directly influencing producers on the
aesthetic quality of the product, as well as on the social quality of the
production processes.
The efficacy and strategy of social labels and their implementers
325
Some scholars and activists
have been a subject of debate, however.
have argued that social labels are often too universalizing in their
standards and approaches, and that social label initiatives should be
3 26
Others argue that
more grounded in local institutions and priorities.
they are ineffective in addressing certain kinds of labor rights
violations, such as freedom of association and collective bargaining
rights.3 27 Also problematic, critics point out, are the inherent cognitive
limitations that consumers have in assessing the relevance and
accuracy of the label's information, and in discerning "good"labels from
"bad" ones.3 28 Other scholars, such as Gay Seidman, have argued that
social labels, and market-centered regulation more generally, are a
poor means of ensuring workers' rights compared to other
development-oriented methods. 329
Despite these critiques, there are signs of success. Arianna Rossi
has argued that Morocco's attempt at creating a social label for its
garment industry led to improvements in health and safety levels in
the industry.3 30 And a number of studies have shown that fair trade
producers who receive certification receive higher prices than do non33
fair-trade farmers for their goods, 1 experience greater financial

33 3
Yet on
stability, 332 and generate improved environmental practices.

the other hand, according to critics, the income benefits accrue largely

325. See Bama Athreya & Brian Campbell, No Access to Justice: The Failure of
Ethical Labeling and Certification Systems for Labor Rights, in WORKERS' RIGHTS AND
LABOR COMPLIANCE IN GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAINS: IS A SOCIAL LABEL THE ANSWER?, supra

note 218, at 226, 233.
326. See Annelies Goger, Ethical Branding in Sri Lanka: A Case Study of
Garments without Guilt, in WORKERS' RIGHTS AND LABOR COMPLIANCE IN GLOBAL
SUPPLY CHAINS: IS A SOCIAL LABEL THE ANSWER?, supra note 218, at 47-48.
327. See Arianna Rossi, The Impact of the Fibre Citoyenne Label on the Moroccan
Garment Industry and its Workers, in WORKERS' RIGHTS AND LABOR COMPLIANCE IN
GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAINS: IS A SOCIAL LABEL THE ANSWER?, supra note 218, at 22.
328. See, e.g., Adam S. Chilton & Galit A. Sarfaty, The Limitationsof Supply Chain
Disclosure Regimes, 53 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1, 1 (2017).
329. Gay W. Seidman, Labouring Under An Illusion? Lesotho's 'sweat-free' label,
30 THIRD WORLD Q. 581, 594-95 (2009) (discussing Lesotho's ill-fated efforts at
generating a sweat free label for Lesotho's garment industry).
330. See Rossi, supra note 328, at 88.
331. See Raluca Dragusanu, Daniele Giovannucci & Nathan Nunn, The Economics
of FairTrade, 28 J. ECON. PERSP. 217, 223-25 (2014); Raynolds, supra note 272, at 417.
332. Dragusanu, Giovannucci, & Nunn, supra note 332, at 228.
333. Id. at 229.
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to farm owners and skilled workers and do not necessarily result in
higher wages for hired laborers. 334
These debates will continue. But social labels and other initiatives'
efforts to generate empathetic relationships with producers by sharing
and publicizing narratives of actual producers have shown potential in
triggering consumer action, even if these relationships are largely
imagined. Private initiatives of supply chain governance, social
labeling schemes, and transnational labor activists have been the
primary user of such tools. But the question this Article next turns to
is: How might those empathetic bonds be drawn on, or the
"sympathies" that were described by Adam Smith,33 5 in public law
initiatives of supply chain governance?

VI. CONSUMER CITIZENSHIP IN PUBLIC LAW

This Article has argued that elements of the supply chain economy
have given rise to a consumer movement for more humane supply
chains born in part from a desire by citizen-consumers to bridge the
gap between production and consumption. This movement has been
partly fueled by activists and media technologies that have fueled the
consumer imaginary. This Part takes a prescriptive turn, focusing on
public law. It asks the questions: (1) How has the law heretofore made
use of the consumer imaginary to achieve the goals of improving labor
conditions in the supply chain? (2) How can these efforts be improved?
These questions are relevant because of the increasing interest by
policy makers at both the federal and state levels in designing laws and
policies that can improve working conditions in global supply chains.
This Part looks at two ways in which US policy endeavors to
regulate labor conditions in the supply chain. The first is through trade
law, while the second is through domestic transparency laws, which
are a far more recent a development, and one that explicitly attempts
to catalyze citizen-consumers to pressure lead firms to regulate their
supply chains. Both mechanisms have been critiqued for inadequately
achieving their aims of improving working conditions in the supply

334. Id. at 232; Raluca Dragusanu & Nathan Nunn, The Impacts of Fair Trade
Certification: Evidence From Coffee Producers in Costa Rica 27-28 (Feb. 28, 2014)
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
335. See MCINTYRE, supra note 276, at 46-48 (discussing Smith's notion of
sympathies in relation to the social distance between lead firms and workers in the
supply chain).
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chain, 336 both in different ways have been motivated by the demands
of citizen-consumers, and both have the potential to improve their
effectiveness by better engaging the consumer imaginary.
A. Trade Law
Social and labor concerns have long been incorporated into US as
well as European trade policy. Perhaps the earliest example is bans by
the United States and other countries on the importation of goods
made by forced or slave labor and prison labor. The bans on slave labor
were largely driven by changing moral norms on slavery and its
general elimination by trading countries in the nineteenth century,
culminating in 1890 when a number of countries signed the Brussels
Conference Act of 1890, putting an end to the slave trade over land and
sea.33 7 The bans on importation of goods made with prison labor were
primarily grounded in economic competition arguments (i.e. that
prison labor is an unfair form of competition because it uses unpaid
labor to produce goods). 338 Indeed, prison labor is the sole labor-related
condition that members of the WTO are explicitly allowed to rely on as
3 39
a basis for discriminating between products.
In the United States there have been, as Steve Charnovitz has
described, a number of attempts to pass legislation denying "entry to
foreign goods produced under 'oppressive' or 'substandard' labor
conditions." 340 Efforts by the Senate and House of Representatives to
336. Some scholars have argued, for example, that in the context of trade, the
provisions simply do not provide for strong enough remedies, see, e.g., Lorand Bartels,
Human Rights, Labour Standards and Environmental Standards in CETA, in MEGAREGIONAL AGREEMENTS: TTIP, CETA, TISA. NEW ORIENTATIONS FOR EU EXTERNAL

ECONOMIC RELATIONS (Stefan Griller et al. eds., 2017), or that the standards themselves
are too weak. See Gerda Van Roozendaal, The Diffusion of Labour Standards:The Case
of the US and Guatemala, 3 POL. & GOVERNANCE 18, 21 (2015). Another line of critique
argues that trade and labor provisions are too focused on state action, and ought to
harness the tools of non-state labor governance that have been used in private
governance. See Kevin Kolben, A Supply Chain Approach to Trade and Labor Provisions,
5 POL. & GOVERNANCE 60, 61 (2017). Scholarly critiques of disclosure laws have argued,
for example, that they do not adequately force disclosure of conditions in supplier
factories, see, e.g., Vinayagamoorthy, supra note 66, while others have argued that
mandated disclosures do not offer enough readily usable information for consumers, in
part because consumers are unable to discern between high quality and low-quality
disclosures. See Chilton & Sarfaty, supra note 328, at 41.
337. This treaty was updated in the United States of America. Convention revising
the General Act of Berlin, February 26, 1885, and of the General Act and the Declaration
of Brussels, July 2, 1890, signed at Saint-Germain-en-Laye, September 10, 1919 L.N.T.S.
19; Africa: Revision Of General Act of Berlin and General Act And Declaration of
Brussels art. 11, Sept. 10, 1919, 8 L.N.T.S. 27, 49 Stat. 3027, which provided that the
countries would "endeavor the complete suppression of slavery in all its forms and of the
slave trade by land and sea."
338. Steve Charnovitz, The Influence of InternationalLabour Standards on the
World Trading Regime - A Historical Overview, 126 INT'L L. REV. 565, 569 (1987).
339. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, art. XX, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat.
A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
340. Charnovitz, supra note 338, at 568.
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make such limitations part of the Fair Labor Standards Act have
failed, however. 3 41 These efforts, as well as those by other countries in
the early twentieth century to impose tariffs on imported goods
manufactured by workers earning lower wages or working in lower
conditions or employment, were grounded in fears of unfair
competition. 342 In other words, they were protectionist measures
designed to protect domestic industries.
But as the nature of the economy changed, and as American
consumers obtained more of their goods from global supply chains that
extended deep into developing countries with poor working conditions,
the emphasis changed. While unfair competition arguments were still
present, ethical and moral justifications also clearly motivated new
trade legislation, both implemented and proposed legislation. Laws
governing imports made with child labor laws are one example. One of
the most significant of these efforts was a bill first sponsored in 1992
by Senator Tom Harkin, an outspoken anti-child labor advocate, called
the Child Labor Deterrence Act, which, if implemented, would have
effectively banned the import of goods made by children under fifteen
years of age. 343 In the Act's Findings, Purpose and Policy section, it is
made clear that a primary purpose of the bill was to promote the
welfare of children and to spur sustainable economic development. 344
It is only in the last of the bill's nine subsections that unfair
competition is mentioned-specifically, the fear that adult workers in
the United States could have their jobs imperiled. 34 5 The bill did not
get out of committee that year, or in the subsequent years that it was
introduced in both the Senate or in the House. 346 It was also widely
criticized by some analysts who argued that the consequences for
children who were deprived of an income as a result of the bill could be
grave. 347 Indeed, some believe that the mere threat of the law led to
the widespread dismissal of many children in Bangladesh's garment
industry, resulting in worse welfare outcomes for those children. 348 Yet
341. Id.
342. Id. at 567.
343. Child Labor Deterrence Act of 1992, S.3133, 102d Congress (1992).
344. Child Labor Deterrence Act (2)(a)(7-8). "(7) The employment of children
under the age of 15 commonly deprives the children of the opportunity for basic education
and also denies gainful employment to millions of adults. (8) The employment of children
under the age of 15, often at pitifully low wages, undermines the stability of families and
ignores the importance of increasing jobs, aggregated demand, and purchasing power
among adults as a catalyst to the development of internal markets and the achievement
of broad-based, self-reliant economic development in many developing countries."
345. Child Labor Deterrence Act (2)(a)(9) (noting that adult workers in the United
States and other developed countries should not have their jobs imperiled by imports
produced by child labor in developing countries).
346. A house version was first introduced by Representative Don Pease in 1989.
Child Labor Deterrence Act of 1989, H.R. Res. 2485, 101st Cong. (1989-1990).
347.

BENJAMIN POWELL, OUT OF POVERTY: SWEATSHOPS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY

84 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2014).
348. Id. (citing reports that some 50,000 children lost their jobs after the Harkin
bill was proposed, some turning to prostitution).
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despite the potentially perverse outcomes, at the time of the bill's
discussion, consumers in the United States and in Europe were
actively engaging in boycotts based on ethical and moral grounds of
Bangladeshi garments, 34 9 and multinational corporations such as Levi
Strauss were making proactive efforts to use codes of conduct to
3 50
eliminate child labor in their supply chains.
In another example following the failure of the Child Labor
Deterrence Act, Congress in 2000 amended 19 U.S.C. § 1307, which
bans the importation of goods made by forced, prison, or indentured
labor generally, to explicitly include forced or indentured child labor in
the definition.3 5 1 A significant loophole in the original law, however,
was that it carved out an exception for products made with forced and
indentured labor that were necessary to import in order to meet
352
But in 2016, the Obama
domestic consumptive demand.
administration signed an amendment to the law that removed the
53
consumptive demand exception.3 What partly motivated the removal
of the provision were revelations in the media about the use of slave
labor in the American seafood supply, particularly in Southeast
Asia.

3 54

These recent developments reflect a move by some governments to
move away from an economic, protectionist-motivated trade and labor
policy toward a justification grounded in labor and human rights. That
is, it is a claim that citizen-consumers have begun to demand, through
legislative and not just market channels, that their governments
include labor, environmental, and human rights concerns in their trade
policy, as well as their corporate governance.
There are several limitations to generalized import bans, however.
One limitation is that to apply the ban, the importing country must be
able to identify specific kinds of activities that are traceable to a
specific country or supplier.3 5 5 This can be rather difficult given the
multiple intermediaries through which goods can travel, concealing
their origins. Second, determinations of whether or not an import ban
is warranted rests upon a binary finding that a violation either exists
349. See Ethel Brooks, Transnational Campaigns Against Child Labor: The
Garment Industry in Bangladesh, in COALITIONS ACROSS BORDERS: TRANSNATIONAL
PROTEST AND THE NEOLIBERAL ORDER 128 (Joe Bandy & Jackie Smith eds., 1995).
350. Id. at 126-27.
351. Bonded Child Labor Elimination Act, Pub. L. No. 106-200, § 411 (2000).
352. 19 U.S.C. § 1307 (2016) amended by Pub. L. No. 114-125 (2016) ("but in no
case shall such provisions be applicable to goods, wares, articles, or merchandise so
mined, produced, or manufactured which are not mined, produced, or manufactured in
such quantities in the United States as to meet the consumptive demands of the United
States.").
353. Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-125,
§ 910 (2016).
354. Trevor Sutton & Avery Siciliano, Seafood Slavery, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS
(Dec. 15, 2016, 5:00 AM), https://www.americanprogress.orglissues/green/ reports/2016/
12/15/295088/seafood-slavery/ [https://perma.cc/H6GK-MNMR] (archived on Aug. 24,
2019).
355. See 19 C.F.R. § 12.42 (2018).
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or does not exist in the manufacturing of the good. Otherwise, it would
be very difficult for governments to make determinations as to whether
or not a good is made with forced or child labor. While such binary
determinations might work for child labor, and to a lesser extent forced
labor, other rights violations, such as freedom of association violations
or gender discrimination, can be harder to make finite determinations
on. Third, import bans could be subject to WTO challenges because
apart from prison labor, there is no explicit exception made for import
discrimination based on labor or human rights standards.3 5 6
Due in part to these limitations, policymakers and activists turned
to other trade-related mechanisms to engage the consumer imaginary
and mobilize citizen-consumers. One such mechanism was unilateral
labor standards and labor rights conditionality, which has been part of
the trade policy of a number of countries for several decades now. In
the United States, conditionality was first included in a unilateral,
preferential trade arrangement in 1983 in the Caribbean Basin
Initiative,3 57 and then was incorporated the next year into the
Generalized System of Preferences.3 5 8 In these laws, the president is
directed to take into account "whether or not such country has taken
or is taking steps to afford to workers in that country (including any
designated zone in that country) internationally recognized worker
rights." 35 9 This language aims to remedy the domestic labor
governance deficit of trading partner countries, by creating incentives
for them to respect core international labor standards. The European
Union, too, has included human rights and labor rights conditionality
in its own unilateral trade programs, known as GSP+. 360 Human rights
have been incorporated into EU trade policy since the early 2000s, and
have become codified in the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, and more recently
in the Strategic Framework on Human Rights and Democracy, adopted
in 2012.36
In recent decades, labor provisions have become a central element
of bilateral and regional trade agreement practice of a number of
countries. According to a recent ILO study of labor provisions in FTAs,
there were seventy-seven trade agreements in place (covering 135

356.

For a discussion of how Article XX could be applied to labor rights violations,

see MICHAEL TREBICOCK, ROBERT HowsE & ANTONIA ELIASON, THE REGULATION OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 733-38 (4th ed. 2013).

357. See 19 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(7) (2018).
358. GSP Renewal Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, 98 Stat. 3019 (1984). See Compa
& Vogt, supra note 27, at 200-02 (discussing the incorporation of labor conditionality
into GSP and its contents).
359. Caribbean Basin Initiative, 19 U.S.C. § 2702(c)(8) (2018); Generalized System
of Preferences, 19 U.S.C. § 2462(c)(7) (2018).
360. See Loran Bartels, The WTO Legality of the EU's GSP+ Arrangement, 10 J.
INT'L ECON. L. 869, 871-72 (2007).
361. Daniela Sicurelli, The EU as a Promoterof Human Rights in BilateralTrade
Agreements: The Case of the Negotiations with Vietnam, 11 J. CONTEMP. EUR. RES. 231,
231 (2015).
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have also been
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increasingly included in investment treaties. According to the ILO,
twelve out of the thirty-one international investment arrangements
364
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that were concluded in 2014 include labor rights protections.
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broadly.
more
regional trade agreements
important given that any possibility of including labor provisions in the
3 66
WTO have been basically foreclosed.
While some have derided labor provisions in trade agreements as
367
the structure and
protectionist both in intent and in practice,
application of labor provisions fail to support this claim. 368 In fact,
while protectionism from some constituencies surely is part of the
calculus, 3 69 labor provisions have been motivated far more by demands
from citizen-consumers and labor activists to include social
conditionality in trade policy. That is, citizen-consumers want to
ensure that the goods that they consume are made using processes that
conform to their ethical and political expectations. The United States
has made a policy choice that trade liberalization must be accompanied
by guarantees that citizen-consumers will be assured that certain
conditions exist that they deem necessary for trade liberalization to be

LO HANDBOOK ON LABOUR PROVISIONS, supra note 28, at 11.
362.
363. INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, ASSESSMENT OF LABOUR PROVISIONS
IN TRADE AND INVESTMENT ARRANGEMENTS 1, 12 (2016) (indicating that over 80% of

trade agreements negotiated since 2008 contain labor provisions); ILO HANDBOOK ON
LABOUR PROVISIONS, supra note 28, at 11.

364. Id. at 27.
365. See, e.g., Gerda Van Roozendaal, Where Symbolism Prospers:An Analysis of
the Impact on Enabling Rights of Labour Standards Provisions in Trade Agreements
with South Korea, 5 POL. & GOVERNANCE 19, 19-20, 26-27 (2017) (suggesting labor
provisions have heretofore been relatively ineffective and symbolic); Kolben, A Supply
ChainApproach to Trade and Labor Provisions, supra note 336, at 61-64 (arguing that
extant approaches to trade and labor provisions are ineffective and need to adopt
experimental approaches combining private and public regulation).
366. See, e.g., Kevin Kolben, The WTO Distraction, 21 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 461
(2010) (arguing that the WTO is not a viable or desirable forum to include labor
provisions).
367. See JAGDISH BHAGWATI, FAIR TRADE TODAY 57 (Princeton Univ. Press 2002).
368. See Andrew Schrank, From Disguised Protectionism to Rewarding
Regulation: The Impact of Trade-relatedLabor Standardsin the DominicanRepublic, 7
REG. & GOVERNANCE 299, 300 (2013) (arguing labor provisions do not serve protectionist
ends but rather are a "beneficial constraint" by promoting a high road to development).
369.
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considered legitimate. 370 Labor provisions are a means of ensuring that
they be assured that those expectations are satisfied.
B. Transparency Laws
A second significant form of legal intervention is the increasing use
of mandated transparency laws. According to Susan Ariel Aaronson
and Ethan Wham, transparency laws "wed government mandates
delineating the 'right to know' with corporate governance and
voluntary corporate social responsibility (CSR) strategies."3 7' They
typically require that companies undertake certain forms of good faith
efforts to discover certain labor rights violations in their supply
chains. 372 The expanding implementation of such laws has been one of
the more interesting developments in recent years. The EU and its
member states as well as the United States have implemented such
legislation,3 7 3 as well as most recently Australia. 3 74 The primary
objective of disclosure mandates as they have been designed has been
to generate accurate information for consumers to make purchasing
decisions, and to provide information to stakeholders to better enable
them to pressure companies to change their supply chain practices. 37 5
But there are other mechanisms that are also activated through
mandatory disclosure laws. As Stephen Park points out, disclosure can
also help generate internal, or what he calls integrative, processes to
align corporate managers' noneconomic commitments with their
economic ones.3 7 6 As Park puts it, "in order for MNEs to maximize the
utility that they derive from complying with [Targeted Social
Transparency] (TST) disclosure requirements, they must be able to
recognize the extent to which the social values underlying the TST
regime bear on their own self-conceptions."
In the United States, the first of these laws, the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank),
provides that public companies that purchase certain minerals from
the Great Lakes Region of Africa must file reports that describe their

370. For an expanded argument on this point, see Kolben, A New Model For Trade
And Labor?, supra note 15, at 1065-79.
371. Aaronson & Wham, supra note 30, at 1.
372. See id. at 6.
373. See id. at 6-12.
374. Modern Slavery Act 2018 (Cth) (Austl.).
375. Chilton & Sarfaty, supra note 328, at 4.
376. Stephen Kim Park, Targeted Social Transparency as Global Corporate
Strategy, 35 Nw. J. INT'L L. & BuS. 87, 115-17 (2014).
377. Id. at 115.
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37 8
due diligence efforts at determining if the minerals are conflict free.
379
This report must also be posted on the covered company's website.
The aim of Congress was to require disclosure of the sourcing of
minerals from regions in which the proceeds would go to armed groups
in the region, which it believed was perpetuating armed conflict
"characterized by extreme levels of violence in the eastern Democratic
Republic of the Congo, particularly sexual- and gender-based violence,
38 0
and contributing to an emergency humanitarian situation therein."
Again, the effectiveness of this law has been debatable. One problem is
that if the goal of Congress was to mobilize citizen-consumers to
pressure covered firms to take action to improve their supply chains, it
is unclear if these kinds of reports are particularly effective in doing
so. Reporting on a company's due diligence efforts to eradicate conflict
minerals from a supply chain is a far more technical kind of reporting
than one might find with, say, a label. A second problem is that it is
very hard to trace the supply chain all the way back to mineral
extraction, and only large companies are likely to have the resources
to significantly vet their supply chains. Indeed, some 67 percent of
companies that filed reports with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission were unable to determine whether their sourced minerals
come from the Democratic Republic of the Congo or one of the other
adjoining countries.38 1 So, even if consumers were able to discern from
the reports what the companies were doing to avoid conflict minerals,
and even if consumers understood what they were, it is unclear if the
382
information they were getting was accurate.

378. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, tit. XV, § 1502, July 21, 2010, 124 Stat. 2213, as amended by Pub. L. No. 114301, § 3(b), Dec. 16, 2016, 130 Stat. 1515 (2018) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act].
Specifically, the Act requires companies to file if "conflict minerals are necessary to the
functionality or production of a product manufactured by such person." Dodd-Frank Act
§ 1502(c)(2)(B). Dodd Frank specifically calls for covered companies to include in a report
a) "a description of the measures taken by the person to exercise due diligence on the
source and chain of custody of such minerals, which measures shall include an
independent private sector audit of such report submitted through the Commission that
is conducted in accordance with standards established by the Comptroller General of the
United States, in accordance with rules promulgated by the Commission, in consultation
with the Secretary of State; and (ii) a description of the products manufactured or
contracted to be manufactured that are not DRC conflict free ('DRC conflict free' is
defined to mean the products that do not contain minerals that directly or indirectly
finance or benefit armed groups in the Democratic Republic of the Congo or an adjoining
country), the entity that conducted the independent private sector audit in accordance
with clause (i), the facilities used to process the conflict minerals, the country of origin
of the conflict minerals, and the efforts to determine the mine or location of origin with
the greatest possible specificity." Dodd-Frank Act § 1502(c)(1)(A)(i-ii). For a discussion,
see Aaronson & Wham, supra note 30, at 7.
379. Dodd-Frank Act § 1502(b)(1)(E)
380. Dodd-Frank Act § 1502(a).
381. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE , GAO-17-544T, CONFLICT MINERALS
INSIGHTS FROM COMPANY DISCLOSURES AND AGENCY ACTIONS 6 (2017).

382.
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A second major transparency law is the California Transparency
in Supply Chains Act (CTSCA). 3 8 3 This law covers retailers or firms
doing business in California with worldwide gross receipts of more
than $100 million worldwide. 38 4 Each covered firm is required to report
on "its efforts to eradicate slavery and human trafficking from its direct
supply chain for tangible goods offered for sale." 3 8 5 The report must

disclose, at a minimum, various aspects of the processes by which the
company monitors its supply chain for slavery and human trafficking,
and implements processes to ensure that the supply chain is
compliant. 38 6 These include, inter alia, the degree to which a
manufacturer or seller (1) engages in verification of supply chains to
evaluate and address risks of human trafficking and slavery, (2)
conducts audits of suppliers, (3) requires direct suppliers to certify that
materials are compliant, (4) maintains internal accountability
standards and procedures for employees or contractors failing to meet
company standards regarding slavery and trafficking, and (5) provides
training to supply chain managers on trafficking and slavery.3 87 The
only remedy available to a plaintiff is injunctive relief. 388
But like Dodd-Frank, the CTSCA also suffers from problems. As is
clear from these disclosure requirements, and as pointed out by Adam
Chilton and Galit Sarfaty, the Act requires companies to file reports on
fairly technical processes, and not on the specific products or the final
results of their findings.3 89 What results is that the consumer
imaginary is given little to work with. If what motivates consumers to
"buycott" and boycott is the imagined connection to producers, then
fairly technical reporting on internal sourcing process will not likely
motivate consumers to take action. Moreover, according to Chilton and
Sarfaty, consumers are generally unable to discern between companies
that engage in "high" due diligence versus those that engage in "low"
383. California Transparency in Supply Chains Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 1714.43
(2012) [hereinafter CTSCA].
384. CTSCA § 1714.43.
385. CTSCA § 1714.43(a)(1).
386. CTSCA § 17.14.43(c)(1-5).
387. CTSCA § 17.14.43(c)(1-5). The text of the Act provides: "(C) The disclosure
described in subdivision (a) shall, at a minimum, disclose to what extent, if any, that the
retail seller or manufacturer does each of the following: (1) Engages in verification of
product supply chains to evaluate and address risks of human trafficking and slavery.
The disclosure shall specify if the verification was not conducted by a third party; (2)
Conducts audits of suppliers to evaluate supplier compliance with company standards
for trafficking and slavery in supply chains. The disclosure shall specify if the verification
was not an independent, unannounced audit; (3) Requires direct suppliers to certify that
materials incorporated into the product comply with the laws regarding slavery and
human trafficking of the country or countries in which they are doing business; (4)
Maintains internal accountability standards and procedures for employees or
contractors failing to meet company standards regarding slavery and trafficking; (5)
Provides company employees and management, who have direct responsibility for supply
chain management, training on human trafficking and slavery, particularly with respect
to mitigating risks within the supply chains of products."
388. CTSCA §§ 17.14.43(c)(1-5), 17.14.43(d).
389. Chilton & Sarfaty, supra note 328, at 23.
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due diligence.3 90 Chilton and Sarfaty conclude from this that
mandatory disclosure might be generally ill-suited to human rights
issues.39 1 But they also suggest that perhaps disclosure could be
designed more effectively, such as by (1) using a standard template for
companies across industries; or (2) requiring "targeted transparency"
to require that consumers receive information, not on websites (as
required by Dodd-Frank and the CTSCA, for example), but right at the
checkout counter using some kind of "rating system whereby the
government or a third party converts disclosed information into a
grade or label (e.g., a trafficking-free label) that is presented to
392
consumers at the time of purchasing."
C. How to Improve?
Chilton and Sarfaty propose a move toward a regime that
translates the technical process-oriented approach of current
transparency law in the United States into one that is more easily
digestible by consumers. Focusing on the end user-the consumertakes supply chain labor governance in a more effective direction. But
this Article takes the discussion a step further both conceptually and
in practice. That is, how should trade and labor provisions, as well as
transparency laws, be reoriented toward triggering the consumer
imaginary? On the one hand, trade and transparency regimes are
currently legitimized and grounded to various degrees in consumer
citizenship frameworks.3 9 3 In other words, they either are justified by,
in the case of import bans and trade and labor provisions, or are only
effective, in the case of transparency laws, if consumers are willing to
mobilize and pressure companies. But none of them are designed to
actually mobilize or trigger the consumer imaginary. What steps might
be taken to make that happen? This Article does not present a
comprehensive set of policy recommendations, but rather proposes
some areas of consideration for further investigation to be pursued in
future work.
1. Trade and Labor Provisions
As of now, US trade and labor provisions primarily utilize what has
been termed in previous work a state action-state sanctions
approach. 394 That is, they aim to change the conduct of states by
evaluating state conduct through intergovernmental processes,
providing for intergovernmental complaint and dispute mechanisms,
390. Id. at 24.
391. Id. at 45-46.
392. Id. at 43-44.
393. For more discussion of this idea, see Kolben, A New Model For Trade And
Labor?, supra note 15, at 1071-75.
394. Id. at 1080-81.
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and providing for remedies if the dispute cannot be settled by the
parties.3 9 5 While in the United States there are federal regulations
that provide a mechanism for third parties to file complaints with the
US government to request,3 9 6 the mechanisms that can trigger TLANs

or citizen-consumers to mobilize are limited.
One example of how US trade and labor provisions hinder
consumer mobilization is that the complaint process for violations of
labor chapters is kept secret until a report is issued by the US
government. Although it would be contrary to typical state practice,
there is no reason why more transparent mechanisms could not be
negotiated into the labor chapter complaint processes. There could be
more public forums in which the affected workers could give testimony
about labor rights violations in their workplaces, and that testimony
could be made public in various fora.3 97 Lead firms could be required
to post links and copies of worker testimony in supplier factories.
Archon Fung et al. have argued for a ratcheting labor standards (RLS)
regime of supply chain governance that would foster experimentalist
regimes of monitoring benchmarking and therefore drive consumer
pressure on lead firms to improve their supply chains.3 98 Building on
the RLS work, it has been argued elsewhere that labor chapters should
implement an "integrative approach" that proposes experimenting
with private governance mechanisms that will help develop domestic
labor law regimes. 3 99 But one remaining question in these proposals
and other proposals that rely on consumers and private regulation is
that, while consumers are central to the success of these governance
regimes, the proposals do not sufficiently address the question of what
kinds of information about working conditions in supply chains will in
fact motivate consumers to take action. 4 00 Such information might
include more direct testimony and stories by and about the affected
workers, such that consumer imaginary mechanisms could be better
triggered.
2. Domestic Transparency Laws
Domestic transparency laws are also well positioned to trigger the
consumer imaginary. But oddly, the ones that have been implemented
395. See id.
396. See 40 C.F.R. Part 63., 71 Fed. Reg. 245 (Dec. 21, 2006).
397. Of course there would also have to be a parallel set of protective laws that the
parties agree to implement to prevent retaliation against those workers akin to antiretaliation rules in the National Labor Relations Act. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158(a) (2018).
398. See ARCHON FUNG ET AL., CAN WE PUT AN END TO SWEATSHOPS?: A NEW
DEMOCRACY FORUM ON RAIsrNG GLOBAL LABOR STANDARDS 1 (Beacon Press 2001).

399. See generally Kevin Kolben, Integrative Linkage: Combining Public and
PrivateRegulatoryApproaches in the Design of Trade and Labor Regimes, 48 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 203 (2007).
400. See Mark Levinson, Wishful Thinking, in CAN WE PUT AN END TO
SWEATSHOPS?: A NEW DEMOCRACY FORUM ON RAISING GLOBAL LABOR STANDARDS, supra

note 398, at 54-55.
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in US federal and state law are somewhat misaligned with achieving
this goal. Chilton and Sarfaty's suggestion that consumers be provided
with information at the checkout counter holds some promise, despite
4 01
But this Article
the somewhat tepid endorsement by the authors.
are relatively
which
labels,
or
suggests moving beyond simply ratings
aim to create
should
laws
cold and impersonal. Instead, transparency
psychic and imagined linkages between the consumers, the suppliers,
other consumers, and, of course, the workers. This would perhaps
40 2
entail direct forms of communication from the workers themselves.
This might include, for example, worker testimonies that have been
provided by NGOs and TLANs that work in the field. To ensure
fairness to companies, the NGOs could go through a governmental
certification process that requires them to meet certain accreditation
standards and that requires them to comply with their own due
diligence standards.
Rather than prescribing a template of specific policy proposals, one
solution drawn from the governance and democratic experimentalism
literature is that NGOs and companies could be left to compete for the
best and most accurate means of conveying the degree to which they
either effectively ensure that their supply chains are compliant with a
certain set of human rights goals, or the ways in which they are
pursuing those ends. 40 3 Companies could be incentivized to convince
their customers to "buycott" in their favor, and if they are required to
provide information on the product itself, much like a cigarette
warning label, they might innovate in figuring out how to convince
consumers to buy their goods. Of course, all of this must be subject to
constant evaluation and monitoring by third parties, so that consumers
can be assured that what they see on the products is in fact accurate
and real. In this sense, we do not want the consumer imaginary to be
deceived by the "corporate" imaginary.
What this means is that disclosure laws can have internal impacts
at the firm level, reorienting priorities and commitments to certain
social goals. By forcing managers to engage with these issues and
requiring that managers engage their own social imagination through
own
producers-their
people-real
with real
confrontation
change.
might
management priorities

401. Chilton & Sarfaty, supra note 328, at 44.
402. See Pigors & Rockenbach, supra note 253, at 3126 (discussing direct
communication).
403. For an example of governance and democratic experimentalism as applied to
labor in global value chains, see FUNG ET AL., supra note 398. For a review of the
governance literature and a critique as it applies to transnational labor regulation, see
Kolben, TrausnationalLabor Regulation and the Limits of Governance, supra note 115,
at 403-04.
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VII. CONCLUSION

The global economic system is under strain in part because of what
many perceive to be the dehumanizing elements and consequences of
the new globalization. One of those consequences has been the rending
of consumer and producer relationships.
While there are many
complicated aspects and causes of the disaffection with the new
economic order, one reaction has been the mobilization of citizenconsumers who seek to improve conditions in the global supply chain
through their purchasing decisions. This Article has argued that the
concept of the consumer imaginary can help describe the relationships
between consumers and producers, and guide policymakers in
developing tools and institutions to utilize its potential. Activating and
mobilizing consumers and the consumer imaginary is not a magic
solution to improving working conditions and protecting labor and
human rights in the supply chain. Rather, it is but one of the many
filaments that constitute the fabric of supply chain governance. It is an
avenue of study that requires more empirical and theoretical attention
from scholars, and one that holds promise to address at least one of the
cleavages and tensions that the shift to a supply chain economy has
helped create.

